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Abstract: 
A policy proposal is to abolish the distinction between regular open-end employment contracts and 
fixed-term contracts and substitute a unique labour contract with a degree of employment protection 
increasing with tenure. A question on the desirability of the “contrat unique” was included in the 2012 
post-electoral survey. Using the answers to this question, this paper proposes an empirical analysis of 
the possible social basis for the contrat unique. Insider/outsider theories would predict that insiders 
would oppose such a reform whereas outsiders would welcome it. Beyond the theoretical and 
empirical problems associated with the definition and identification of insiders and outsiders, the 
results of the estimations do not bring an overwhelming support for the insider/outsider theories. The 
bulk of the social support for the CTU is made of “insiders”. The social support for the contrat unique 
resembles the traditional social base of the Right with the addition of some “outsiders”. 
Keywords: contrat de travail unique/ single labour contract, insider/outsider, political economy 
JEL classification: J41, P16 
 
Qui veut le contrat de travail unique ?  
La base sociale favorable à la flexibilisation du marché du travail en France 
Résumé:  
Une proposition de réforme du marché du travail est de substituer un contrat de travail unique, don’t 
la protection se renforcerait avec la durée dans l’emploi, aux contrats à durées determine et 
indéterminée. Une question de l’enquête post-électorale 2012 porte sur ce contrat. Cet article utilize 
les réponses pour tenter de cerner la base sociale susceptible de soutenir une réforme majeure de 
flexibilisation du marché du travail. Les théories insiders/outsiders prédisent que les insiders devraient 
s’opposer à cette réforme alors que les outsiders y seraient favorables. Les résultats obtenus ne vont 
pas dans ce sens. Le cœur de la base sociale du contrat unique est composé d’insiders. Cette base 
sociale ressemble à la base électorale de la droite avec l’addition de certains groupes d’outsiders.  
Mots clés: contrat de travail unique, insider/outsider, économie politique 
Classification JEL: J41, P16 
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1. Introduction 
Since at least the beginning of the 1990s, it has become increasingly commonplace in the 
economic policy debate to blame high and persistent unemployment in Europe on the “rigidity” of 
labour market institutions (Bean, 1994; Siebert, 1997). Although contested (Baker et al., 2005; 
Howell et al. 2007; Amable et al. 2011; Howell, 2011; Amable and Mayhew, 2011), this view has 
become prominent in the recommendations made by international organisations: the OECD in its 
original jobs strategy (1994), the European Employment Strategy (European Commission, 1997), the 
IMF (2003) or again the OECD (2006) with a reassessment of the 1994 jobs strategy. Strong 
employment protection legislation is taken to be an impediment to hiring and is considered as a 
priority area for labour market reform (OECD, 1999, 2007, 2012).  
Employment protection legislation (EPL) is also blamed for fuelling dualism on the labour 
market (Boeri, 2010). A high level of protection would insure labour market “insiders” from 
macroeconomic shocks, and the employment cost of the necessary adjustment to the business cycle 
would be borne by “outsiders”, in particular younger workers.1 This would explain the rise of 
nonstandard forms of employment (Blanchard and Tirole, 2003a), temporary employment (fixed-
term contracts, agency work...) or part time work, as well as the high level of unemployment among 
young people.2 The existence of two parallel labour markets,3 one where workers enjoy the 
protections of standard employment with “permanent contracts”, and another one where workers 
have contracts that leave them exposed to all business cycle-related risks, is also considered to be at 
the root of several economic inefficiencies: an inefficient labour turnover because firms are reluctant 
to transform temporary contracts into open-end contracts, an inefficient allocation of human 
resources because opportunities offered to outsiders are limited by the positions held by insiders, or 
a suboptimal level of training because of the lack of commitment from both employers and 
temporary workers. 
These views have gained prominence in the public policy debate in France, a country that the 
OECD ranks among those with the highest level of employment protection4 and where the 
unemployment rate never went under 7% over the past three decades. The ineffectiveness of 
economic policy to bring back full employment once led a disillusioned President Mitterrand to claim 
that everything had been tried out in vain in the fight against unemployment. This lack of success has 
spurred the partisans of a yet untried answer to the unemployment question: a significant 
liberalisation of the labour market. 
The idea that labour market dualism and rigidities should be strongly diminished has led to 
the proposition to abolish the legal conditions for the existence of a dual labour market and 
substitute a single labour contract to the existing permanent and temporary contracts (Blanchard 
and Tirole 2003b, Camdessus, 2004). The idea was exposed more precisely in a report written by two 
economists, P. Cahuc and F. Kramarz (2004),5 who proposed the abolition of the distinction between 
open-end and fixed-term contracts and the substitution of a contrat de travail unique (hereafter 
CTU), i.e. a single employment contract that would have workers’ rights in terms of benefits and 
entitlements as well as firms’ firing costs increasing with tenure. Formally, the new contract would be 
open-end, but firms would be relieved of some of their obligations in case of employment 
termination: no obligation to propose an alternative employment plan in case of collective dismissal 
and no obligation to give an economic motive for the termination of the contract and therefore no 
possibility for a judge to check whether such a motive is valid. The proposed rationale for such a 
                                                            
1 On the insider-outsider theory, see Lindbeck and Snower (1988). 
2 For a recent assessment of youth unemployment, see Bell and Blanchflower (2011). 
3 A pioneering work on labour market dualism is Doeringer and Piore (1971). 
4 With a value of 3 for an indicator of employment protection that scales from 0 (least stringent EPL) to 6 (most 
restrictive EPL). For comparison, the US has an EPL indicator value less than 1 (data are for 2008/2009). 
5  Similar propositions have been made for Italy (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2009). 
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contract was that the flexibility of the CTU at the beginning of the employment relationship would 
encourage job creation, whereas the level of protection increasing with tenure would be an incentive 
to invest in co-specific assets such as training and skills. 6  
One cannot address the issue of labour market flexibility without raising the question of the 
political economy of labour market reforms (Saint-Paul, 2000). The increasing degree of employment 
protection associated with the CTU could be an improvement for workers formerly having fixed-term 
contracts, although they would lose the security attached to the fixed duration of the contract; but 
the situation of workers formerly holding permanent contracts could be worsened. For these 
reasons, the proposed implementation of such contracts is generally thought of as a “two-tier” 
reform, applying to new hires only.7 Nevertheless, “insiders” would be concerned too, should they 
losing their jobs or simply change jobs. Therefore one may expect that the suppression of permanent 
contracts would be met with the opposition of insiders and the organisations that defend them. The 
terms of such an opposition between insiders and outsiders are well-known (Saint-Paul, 2000), but 
the consideration of the public debate on the issue of the CTU as well as the difficulties met by the 
project point to the existence of other cleavages.  
The implementation of the CTU was one of the reforms promised by Nicolas Sarkozy’s during 
the 2007 Presidential campaign,8 along with the promise of a ‘sécurité sociale professionnelle’. The 
former would increase labour market flexibility and the latter would represent the security part of 
what was supposed to represent a French version of flexicurity. Neither the former nor the latter was 
implemented during Nicolas Sarkozy’s term for lack of a clear social support for the CTU. Proposed by 
the Prime Minister François Fillon to the social partners shortly after Nicolas Sarkozy’s election, both 
firms’ and workers’ unions rejected the CTU (Fabre, 2008; Gaudu, 2008). Trade unions considered 
that implementing it would threaten the security attached to permanent contracts, which still 
represent over 85% of all wage contracts,9 and generalise job insecurity. Firms had in 2007 other 
priorities than the CTU. Labour market flexibility was and still is high on their agenda, but the end of 
the 35-hour week and the implementation of the so-called “conventional termination” of the labour 
contract were priority targets in 2007, not the CTU.10 Besides, neither the MEDEF (the organisation 
representing large firms) nor the CGPME (representing small and medium-sized firms) wants a single 
contract to replace interim and short-term contracts, which both organisations find a cheaper 
alternative. The existence of several contracts satisfies large and small firms alike, and their main 
objective is to increase flexibility on each type of contract. As a consequence, making the CTU as part 
of a deal on flexicurity between unions and firms was not possible in 2007. According to an “insider” 
of the bargaining, the MEDEF’s only preoccupation then was to give ‘as little as possible’ (Verhaeghe, 
2011). It is therefore no wonder that nothing came of it. 
The issue of the single contract cropped up again shortly before the 2012 Presidential 
election when the national association of human resources managers (ANDRH) expressed its support 
for the implementation of the CTU, within a framework of collective bargaining involving 
competitiveness and employment issues.11 The reaction of the then Minister of labour and 
                                                            
6 However, in 2006, the Conseil d’Orientation de l’Emploi, which depends from the Prime Minister and provides 
expertise on all employment-related topics, pointed out the legal difficulties that the implementation of the 
CTU could meet. It was likely to be incompatible with the obligation stated in the fourth article of the ILO 
Convention 158 (Termination of Employment Convention, 1982) to provide a valid reason for the termination 
of an employment contract. 
7  This would “mechanically” increase dualism (Boeri, 2010). 
8  Sarkozy (2007). 
9 86.5% in 2011. Source : Insee, enquête Emploi 2011. 
10 The “conventional termination”, which was introduced in the labour law in 2008, is a drastic simplification of 
employment termination when both employer and employee agree (Fabre, 2008). Between 2008 and 2012, 
one million of such terminations have taken place. 
11 Assises nationales de l’Association Nationale des DRH, 17 June 2011 
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employment, Xavier Bertrand, was cautious. The option could be taken into consideration, but only 
when this could represent a “win-win” solution for both firms and wage-earners. The Centrist 
candidate to the Presidential election, François Bayrou, included the CTU in his program and 
promised that fixed-term contracts would be limited to special cases (maternity leave replacements, 
seasonal jobs…). The single contract is still considered as an objective, at least on paper, by the main 
party on the Right, the UMP. Both candidates12 to the presidency of the party of former President 
Nicolas Sarkozy, in 2012 have expressed their support to the CTU. Besides, the issue came back in the 
public debate at the beginning of 2013 when the socialist-led government took the initiative of 
launching a bargaining on employment between trade unions and firms’ organisations, with the 
objective of finding a “win-win” agreement which could involve trading off labour flexibility for 
security. Various business personalities more or less loosely linked with the government (e.g. Louis 
Gallois, former CEO of EADS and SNCF) expressed their support for schemes resembling the CTU.13 
To sum up, the CTU holds an ambiguous position in the public policy debate: officially taken 
to be a solution to France’s unemployment problem by political parties of the Right and Centre-Right 
and promoted by neoliberal think-tanks14 and numerous mainstream economists, cautiously 
considered as a possibility in the context of a flexicurity deal by some fractions of the socialist party, 
but considered with varying degrees of hostility or indifference by the majority of the Left, trade 
unions and firms’ organisations. The question of the social support to the CTU remains open. 
The aim of this article is to check the existence of a social base for a labour market reform 
such as the CTU. A question on the implementation of the CTU was included in the 2012 French post-
electoral survey. In the following, the determinants of the answers to this question will be 
investigated. The article is organised as follows. Next section reviews the theoretical elements that 
could explain why some individuals could be more likely to be supportive of a labour market reform 
such as the CTU than others. The issues of the insider/outsider divide and its empirical 
implementation are reviewed. Section 3 exposes the empirical strategy adopted. Section 4 discusses 
the first series of results which check for correlations between different dimensions of social 
stratification and the support for the CTU. Section 5 considers extended models that incorporate 
different dimensions. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Attitudes towards labour contract protection and social characteristics of the 
individual 
One may consider several hypotheses regarding the possible support for a labour market 
reform such as the CTU. Individuals finding it difficult to enter the labour market or holding atypical 
contracts could in principle be favourable to a measure which would not harm their current situation 
and could improve it in the long run. The insider/outsider divide should therefore be found as a 
significant explanation for diverging opinions about the desirability of the CTU. Similar arguments can 
be found in economics (e.g. Saint-Paul, 2000, 2002) as well as political science (Rueda, 2005, 2006). 
Employment protection is held to protect insiders and individuals as well as organisations (trade 
unions) and political (social democratic) parties that represent them should be opposed to its 
dismantling whereas outsiders and employers should support it. 
Some theoretical objections to these predictions have been raised. One line of argument is 
that individuals’ preferences with respect to labour market regulation may not result from a strictly 
economic rationality (Emmenegger, 2009). Other, social or political, determinants, would explain 
preferences regarding labour contract regulation. Thus, outsiders may express the same preferences 
                                                            
12  Former Prime Minister François Fillon and Jean-François Copé. 
13 Louis Gallois : «Il y a trop d’emplois précaires». Interview in Le Parisien, 11 January 2013. 
14 E.g. the Institut Montaigne founded by former CEO of AXA, Claude Bébéar. 
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as insiders out of working class solidarity for instance.15 Another possibility is that outsiders may 
doubt that labour market flexibilisation should lead to an improvement of their career prospects. As 
mentioned above, the positive employment effect of lower employment protection is a controversial 
topic among economists, why should there be unanimity on its benefits among outsiders? Other 
elements may explain why outsiders could express preferences similar to those of insiders: they may 
have their income partly depend on that of an insider, when living with one in the same household 
for instance (Pierson, 2001), or they may hope to become insiders themselves, when they have a 
high skill level for instance, and thus identify with insiders rather outsiders. In short, insider/outsider 
theory may explain why insiders should oppose labour market deregulation and self-employed or 
employees in a privileged position on the labour market favour it, but it may be less relevant to 
explain the preferences of outsiders (Emmenegger, 2009). 
These theoretical objections explain also the empirical difficulty to identify outsiders. The 
most obvious definition of an outsider considers the employment status of the individual (Lindbeck 
and Snower, 1988). Following this, individuals who are unemployed or are employed with an atypical 
contract, i.e. not an open-end contract or a voluntarily chosen fixed-term contract, could be 
considered as outsiders. The characterisation of the outsider status in reference to the employment 
status has been criticised (Häusermann and Schwander, 2012). What could be labelled “ontological” 
outsiders may experience periods of typical employment whereas ontological insiders may 
occasionally be employed with an atypical contract or even be unemployed. The employment status 
at a given time would therefore be an imperfect signal of the insider/outsider divide. Häusermann 
and Schwander (2009a,b) propose a definition of socio-structural outsider groups based on 
occupation and class partly inspired by Oesch (2006). Five ‘post-industrial class groups’ are 
distinguished: capital accumulators (CA: large employers and self-employed professionals), socio-
cultural professionals (SCP: teachers, nurses, librarians...), blue-collar workers (BC), low service 
functionaries (LSF), and mixed service functionaries (MSF: a residual category). These groups are 
interacted with gender and age since these dimensions are commonly taken to be strong indicators 
of the actual or potential outsider status (Esping-Andersen, 1999). The age variable leads to a 
classification between young (under-40) and old (over-40). Häusermann and Schwander (2009b) 
distinguish three degrees of “outsiderness”: strong, medium and low potential. The different 
categories are given in Table 1. The groups with high outsider potential are young and female low 
service functionaries and socio-cultural professionals. The classification is made using the ISCO88 
classification of activities and the Table of correspondence given in Appendix 1 of Häusermann and 
Schwander (2009b). Häusermann and Schwander (2009b) distinguish several definitions of insiders 
and outsiders according to the welfare regime typology of Esping-Andersen (1990): Liberal, Nordic, 
Continental (and Southern). 
                                                            
15 These aspects are partly taken into account by economists (e.g. Saint-Paul, 2004) who contend that 
“ideology” explains individual preferences or that outsiders are “manipulated” by unions. Plugging these 
elements into an individual rationality-based argument has a strong ad hoc flavour though. 
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Table 1. Insider/outsider classifications according to Häusermann and Schwander (2009a,b) 
 Häusermann and Schwander (2009a) Häusermann and 
Schwander 
(2009b) 
Continental 
regime 
Southern 
regime 
 
Insiders 
Low 
outsider 
potential 
Male low service 
functionaries; 
male socio-
cultural 
professionals; 
male Blue-collar; 
mixed service 
functionaries; 
capital 
accumulators 
Old male low 
service 
functionaries; 
old socio-
cultural 
professionals; 
male Blue-
collar; mixed 
service 
functionaries; 
capital 
accumulators 
Blue-collar 
workers; capital 
accumulators; 
mixed service 
functionaries 
Medium 
outsider 
potential 
Male low service 
functionaries; old 
low service 
functionaries; 
male socio-
cultural 
professionals; old 
socio-cultural 
professionals 
outsiders 
Female low 
service 
functionaries; 
female Blue-
collar; female 
socio-cultural 
professionals 
Young low 
service 
functionaries; 
old female low 
service 
functionaries; 
young socio-
cultural 
professionals; 
female Blue-
collar 
Strong 
outsider 
potential 
Female low 
service 
functionaries; 
young low service 
functionaries; 
female socio-
cultural 
professionals; 
young socio-
cultural 
professionals 
These classifications are questionable. For instance, it is far from certain that the outsider 
potential of an old male low-skilled blue collar worker is systematically lower than that of a young 
female worker or that male blue collar workers should be systematically classified in the same 
category as managers and lawyers. But criticisms of this type could be addressed to the bulk of the 
literature based on the insider/outsider divide. Häusermann and Schwander (2009a) make further 
distinctions according to the level of skills according to the ISCO-88 classification and the level of 
education (the high-skilled have completed a higher secondary education, the low-skilled have 
completed a below higher secondary education). 
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3. Empirical strategy 
Tests will be performed on the influence of individual characteristics on the answers to the 
question concerning the CTU included in the 2012 post-electoral survey: ‘Would you be in favour or 
against the implementation of a single employment contract replacing the fixed-term and open-end 
contracts? Dismissal would be easier than with an open-end contract but dismissal indemnities would 
increase with tenure’. Four possibilities to answer were given, excluding the possibility to be neither 
in favour nor against: very much in favour; rather in favour; rather against; very much against. 
Results of the survey for that question are given in Table 2. 38% of the respondents are broadly in 
favour of such a measure whereas almost half the respondents are opposed to it. For comparison, 
poll results published in January 2013 indicated that 72% of the population were opposed to the end 
of the open-end contract16 against 26% in favour of it. Another poll (Harris Interactive pour la CGT, 
September 2012) asked for opinion about various possible measures to fight unemployment and 
gave the following figures: 61% of the respondents were opposed to labour market flexibilisation 
through easier hire and fire whereas 37% were favourable to it.  
In the post-electoral survey used hereafter, 12.8% of the respondents express no opinion on 
the CTU, almost all of them giving a ‘do not know’ answer to the question. This not negligible 
percentage may have to do with the absence of a neutral answer (neither in favour nor against) but 
may also reflect that some respondents may not feel concerned by the CTU because they are no 
longer part of the active population for instance. For these reasons, the “no response” will be 
analysed separately.  
Table 2. Distribution of answers to the question on the CTU. 
Answer Percentage of respondents   
very much in favour 8.3% } 38.0% somewhat in favour 29.7% 
somewhat against 27.9% } 49.2% very much against 21.3% 
No response 12.8%  12.8% 
 
Tests will be performed according to the following sequence. A first step will be to see what 
types of individuals do not express an opinion on the CTU. A dichotomous variable is considered, 
taking the value 1 when the individual has given a “no response” and zero otherwise. Specific 
estimations will be performed on this variable. A second step will take all the ordered choice answers 
to the CTU question, i.e. taking out the “no response”, and make an ordered probit estimation. For 
robustness purposes, answers to the CTU question are then dichotomised in two directions: first 
gathering the very favourable and somewhat favourable answers in a pro-CTU dummy variable and 
second gathering the very unfavourable and somewhat unfavourable answers in a contra-CTU 
variable. Probit estimations will be performed with both variables as dependent variables. Since 
these last estimations are made on the whole sample, another robustness check will be performed 
by restricting the sample to individuals that have expressed an opinion on the CTU, i.e. by removing 
the “no response”. Last, a Heckman two-step estimation will be made on the dichotomised variable 
expressing the support to the CTU in order to check whether the “no response” alter the conclusions 
                                                            
16 Poll made by BVA: Baromètre de l’économie, janvier 2013. The question was less precise than that of the 
enquête post-électorale and did not mention explicitely the CTU but the transformation of the open-end 
contract in order to facilitate hiring. 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.08
8 
 
drawn from the previous estimations taking as selection variables significant variables explaining the 
“no response” pattern identified in the first-step estimations. 
The empirical strategy is not uniquely focused on the issue of the insider/outsider divide but 
addresses the more general question of how social differentiation affects preferences towards the 
CTU. In this respect, several dimensions can be taken into account. 
Gender and age. Employment opportunities are likely to differ according to the gender and 
the age of the individual. Most contributions to the insider/outsider literature emphasise that young 
or female individuals are likely to be disproportionately disadvantaged by barriers to hiring. A gender 
variable will be considered (for women) and different age brackets will be included as dummy 
variables: 18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, over 65, as well as 25 to 54 (prime age) and 
over 55. 
Type of activity. The relevance of the CTU may differ according to the activity of the 
individual. The answers to the question regarding the activity of the respondent will be used to 
distinguish: paid full-time job; paid part-time job; school; unemployed; retired; home duties; ill or 
disabled. 
Sources of household’s income. This is different from the type of activity of the individual but 
influences the relevance of the CTU too. The following sources of income are considered: wages; self-
employment’s income; pensions; capital income. 
Income and wealth levels as well as education and skills are also potentially important 
determinants of the attitude towards labour market liberalisation: 
Level of income. The level of household income is individualised by dividing it by the squared 
root of the size of the household in order to account for possible intra-household economies of scale. 
Deciles of this individualised income are then taken into account as explanatory variables. 
Level of wealth of the household. Five categories are distinguished: over 300000 Euros 
(corresponding to the 87th percentile of the wealth distribution in France), between 150000 (70th 
percentile) and 300000 Euros, between 75000 (46th percentile) and 150000 Euros, between 7500 
(30th percentile) and 75000 Euros and less than 7500 Euros. 
Education level. The following levels are distinguished, based on the highest level of 
education attained by the respondent: primary education, secondary (general) education, first level 
professional education,17 secondary professional education,18 higher professional education,19 first 
(L) level general higher education, university degree (M or D). 
Insider/outsider. A central question is how the insider/outsider divide can be taken into 
account. As mentioned above, one may rely on the employment status of the individual or on some 
other definition of the outsider potential of the respondent. 
Starting with the status-based definition, the typical employment contract will be defined 
here as an open-end contract for full-time employment or a part-time job because of the individual’s 
own decision. On the other hand, if the individual is unemployed, or works part-time but not because 
                                                            
17 Corresponding to the Certificat d’aptitude professionnelle (CAP) or Brevet d’études professionnelles (BEP). 
18 Corresponding to professional or technical baccalaureates 
19 Corresponding to the University Diploma in Technology and a professional bachelor degree. 
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of her/his own decision, or has a fixed term contract and earns less than 2000 Euros per month,20 it 
will be defined as an outsider and a dummy variable for this status will be entered in the regressions. 
Defining what an insider is beyond a negative definition (i.e. not an outsider) could be useful too. An 
insider will be defined as an individual who is civil servant or has an open-end contract in the public 
or the private sector, or a fixed term contract with a monthly income over 4000 Euros (91th 
percentile of the French income distribution).21 The “insider” and “outsider” dichotomous variables 
thus defined will be considered as explanatory variables. In the sample, 63.4% of the respondents are 
therefore “insiders”, and 14.4% “outsiders, 22.2% being neither.  
The identification of the insider/outsider definition may be extended in order to take into 
account the situation of the individual’s partner when there is one. Variables indicating the insider or 
the outsider status of the partner will therefore be considered.  
The other definitions of insider/outsider are based on Häusermann and Schwander (2009a, 
b). Since it is never very clear whether France belongs to the Continental or the Southern welfare 
state regime, both definitions of insiders and outsiders for respectively the Continental and Southern 
regime will be considered, in addition to the “post-industrial class groups”. 
To complete this analysis, the definition of occupations according to the INSEE PCS 2003 
level-2 classification is also considered. For our purpose, the following occupations are distinguished: 
managers and high-skill (mostly self-employed) professionals; farmers, craftsmen and shopkeepers; 
high-skill public sector employees; high-skill private sector employees; medium-skill public sector 
employees; medium-skill private sector employees; technicians and associate professionals; public 
sector clerk; private sector clerk; personal services employees; skilled workers; unskilled workers. 
The distinction between private and public sector employment as well as the differences in skill level 
and responsibility are important for defining the individual’s assessment of the potential risks and 
opportunities attached to the CTU. 
Additional characteristics worthy of interest are the following. The attitude towards labour 
market liberalisation is likely to be influenced by the individual’s perception of his or her own labour 
market risk. This can be directly assessed since a question of the survey asks: should you lose your 
current job, how difficult would it be to find another one within the next 12 months? Possible answers 
are: very easy, somewhat easy, somewhat difficult, and very difficult. These answers will be entered 
in the estimations as dummy variables for each choice of answer. Other risks could be considered 
through other questions of the survey. Since the CTU was intended as part of a deal on flexibility, 
trading off security for flexibility, the stability of the social protection system should be a crucial 
element in deciding whether the CTU is an acceptable option for wage-earners incurring 
unemployment risks. A question asks whether the respondent is worried that European integration 
should lead to less social protection in France. The binary answer (worried/not worried) will be used 
to construct a dummy variable. 
Since the proposition of a single labour contract has a strong partisan character (no Left party 
ever officially expressed any support for it), it may also be relevant to introduce variables reflecting 
opinions and votes. Regarding opinions, the questions concerning employment/unemployment may 
be relevant. A question asks about the degree of approval (four possibilities) of the following 
proposition: the unemployed could find work if they really wanted to. Four dummy variables for the 
four possible answers will be considered. Another question concerns what the most and second most 
                                                            
20  Since no question was asked about the reason for having a fixed-term contract, it is not possible to assess 
whether the individual has chosen not to have a permanent job. A monthly income of 2000 Euros corresponds 
to the 61st percentile of the French income distribution. The median income is 1660 Euros. 
21 This leaves, among others, individuals with a fixed-term contract and a monthly income between 2000 Euros 
and 4000 Euros being neither insiders nor outsiders. 
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important problems facing France are. Dummies for answers corresponding respectively to 
employment and youth unemployment will be considered. Votes in the first round of the presidential 
election will give as many dummy variables as candidates. Finally, using the self-positioning of the 
individual on the Left/Right axis, five dummy variables corresponding to far Left, Left, Centre, Right, 
and far Right are constructed. 
All estimations follow the same procedure, which is adopted in order to obtain parsimonious 
specifications and limit the risk of spurious regressions. Variables are entered in a model when they 
are statistically significant and removed when their significance falls below the 10% level.  
4. Estimation results 
Estimations were made by considering each type of social and individual differentiation at a 
time. Results of the estimations are summed up in Table 3, which indicates which variables have 
obtained significant coefficients. Details of the regression results are given in Appendix. The Table’s 
results must be read as follows. The estimations taking into account the age and gender variable 
have been made by defining the individuals aged between 18 and 24 as the excluded category. 
Regarding the estimation for the “no response”, individuals aged over 65 and women have a 
significantly higher probability to give a “no response” to the CTU question than the other 
respondents; individuals aged between 25 and 44 have a significantly lower probability to give a “no 
response” to the CTU question than the other respondents. Restricting the sample to respondents 
who have expressed an opinion on the CTU, the ordered probit estimation indicates that individuals 
aged over 55 tend to give answers more significantly in favour of the CTU (choices are ordered from 
very favourable to very unfavourable). The probit estimation on the dichotomous pro-CTU variable 
confirms that this age group is significantly more in favour of the CTU than the other respondents. 
Finally the estimation for the contra-CTU variable indicates that individuals aged 25 to 34 and 35 to 
44 (but at the 10% significance level) express more than the other respondents a negative opinion on 
the CTU whereas individuals aged over 55 and women (at the 10% significance level) express such 
negative opinions less than the other respondents. When one removes the “no response” for the 
probit estimations concerning the pro- or anti-CTU opinion, only individuals aged 55 and above 
express a significant difference of opinion with respect to the other respondents (this is indicated in 
bold characters). The Heckman two-step estimation gives results close to the previous ones and the 
comparison test leads to reject the independence of the probit and selection equations.
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 estimation Dependent variable Significant positive influence Significant negative influence 
Age and gender 
(excluded 
category: 18-
24) 
probit No response Over 65; women 25-34 and 35-44 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered choice excluding 
no response 
 Over 65 and 55-64 
Probit  Binary choice: pro CTU Over 65 and 55-64  
probit Binary choice: contra CTU 25-34; 35-44* Over 65 and 55-64; women* 
Heckman 
two-step 
probit 
Binary choice: pro CTU Over 65 and 55-64  
Source of 
household’s 
income 
(excluded 
category: 
welfare 
benefits) 
probit No response  wages 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered choice excluding 
no response 
 Pensions; property income 
Probit  Binary choice: pro CTU pensions  
probit Binary choice: contra CTU wages Pensions; property income 
Heckman 
two-step 
probit 
Binary choice: pro CTU Pensions; property income  
Type of activity 
(excluded 
category: paid 
full-time job) 
probit No response Retired; home duties; students  
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered choice excluding 
no response 
 Retired; home duties 
Probit  Binary choice: pro CTU Unemployed; retired  
probit Binary choice: contra CTU  Unemployed; retired; home duties 
Heckman 
two-step 
probit 
Binary choice: pro CTU retired  
Wealth probit No response Wealth unknown; refuse to answer  
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(excluded 
category: less 
than 7K Euros) 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered choice excluding 
no response 
 Wealth over 300K Euros; refuse to answer 
Probit  Binary choice: pro CTU Wealth over 300K Euros Wealth between 150K and 300K Euros 
probit Binary choice: contra CTU Wealth between 150K and 300K Euros Wealth over 300K Euros; Wealth unknown; 
refuse to answer 
Heckman 
two-step 
probit 
Binary choice: pro CTU Wealth over 300K Euros  
Household 
income 
(excluded 
category: 1st 
decile) 
probit No response  8th* and 10th deciles 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered choice excluding 
no response 
3rd decile 5th and 10th deciles 
Probit  Binary choice: pro CTU 5th and 10th deciles 2nd decile* 
probit Binary choice: contra CTU 3rd , 8th* and 9th deciles 5th and 10th deciles 
Heckman 
two-step 
probit 
Binary choice: pro CTU 5th and 10th deciles 3rd decile 
Education level 
(excluded 
category: 
education 
unknown) 
probit No response Primary education; secondary education higher professional education; professional 
education 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered choice excluding 
no response 
 Primary education; secondary education; 
tertiary education M and D 
Probit  Binary choice: pro CTU Secondary education; tertiary education M 
and D 
 
probit Binary choice: contra CTU  Primary education; secondary education; first 
level professional;  tertiary education M and D; 
Heckman 
two-step 
probit 
Binary choice: pro CTU Secondary education; tertiary education M 
and D 
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Table 3. Estimation results summary: statistically significant variables. 
 
Education level 
and age 
(excluded 
category:  
education 
unknown ) 
probit No response Primary, first level professional  and 
secondary education over 65 
Prime age (25-54) professional education, 
higher professional education and tertiary 
education L  
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered choice excluding 
no response 
Prime age first level professional, 
professional and higher professional 
education; prime age tertiary L;  higher 
professional education 18-24 
Tertiary M and D over 55 
Probit  Binary choice: pro CTU  Prime age first level professional, professional 
and higher professional education; prime age 
tertiary L;  higher professional education 18-
24; primary education over 65 
probit Binary choice: contra CTU Prime age first level professional, 
professional and higher professional 
education; prime age tertiary L;  tertiary D 
under 55; professional education 18-24 
primary and secondary education over 65; 
tertiary D over 55 
Heckman 
two-step 
probit 
Binary choice: pro CTU Tertiary  M and D over 55 Primary education over65; prime age first level 
professional and education; young and prime 
age professional and higher professional 
education; young and prime age tertiary  M and 
D; young tertiary L 
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It seems therefore that individuals that would not be that much affected by the CTU (most 
individuals over 65 and a certain fraction of those over 55 are pensioners)22 are less likely to express 
a precise opinion on that matter, and when they do, they are generally favourable to the 
implementation of the CTU. On the other hand, those that would be more likely affected (prime age 
wage-earners) are less likely to give a “no response”, and when they do, they are not particularly 
favourable to the CTU. 
Regressions made on the main source of household’s income confirm the previous pattern. 
Individuals living on pension and property income are more prone to supporting the CTU than other 
individuals, in particular wage earners. 
This is followed by the regressions on the levels of wealth and income. Estimations with 
wealth variables indicate that individuals in wealthy households are on average more favourable to 
the CTU than others. The pattern is less clear regarding income levels. High incomes are less likely to 
give a “no response” but they are not the only category favourable to the CTU since middle-income 
earners (5th decile) also express favourable opinions.  
The differentiation according to education level gives only basic results: respondents with 
low levels of general education are less likely to have an opinion and highly educated individuals are 
on average more favourable to the CTU. It is interesting to take the age variable in consideration too 
because of the specificity of the responses of pensioners/seniors and the fact that the level of 
education varies substantially with age: seniors are over-represented in the primary education 
category.23 The education variables are interacted with four age categories: young (18 to 24), prime 
age (25-54), 54-65 and over 65. When the categories obtained concern too few individuals, two age 
categories are grouped together: tertiary education level M or D for instance. The results for these 
interacted variables are much more informative than when education is taken alone. Prime age 
individuals, particularly with a professional education, are opposed to the CTU. The only category to 
be significantly in favour of the CTU is that of highly educated individuals over 55. These respondents 
have indeed significantly higher income and wealth levels than the other respondents.24 One may 
infer from their social position in terms of age, skills and wealth that these individuals may not feel 
threatened by the implementation of the CTU.  
The preliminary conclusions from this first set of results is that the support to the CTU seems 
to come from individuals who are either not threatened or not concerned by its implementation, 
which does not speak in favour of the importance of an insider/outsider divide on this matter. To 
investigate this question in more details, we now turn to the results from estimations using the 
various definitions of the insider/outsider distinction. 
Starting with the employment status-based definition, one sees that both insiders and 
outsiders (in the restricted or even extended sense) are less likely to give a “no response”. The 
seemingly more robust result concerns individuals having an insider partner: they are less likely to 
support the CTU than others. This is a partial confirmation that the insider/outsider status influences 
the attitude towards the CTU, but the status of the partner seems to matter more and outsiders, 
either in the extended or the restricted sense), do not express a clear support for the CTU. 
                                                            
22 46% of the 55-64 in the sample. 
23 40% of the over 65 are in this education category vs. 15% for the sample average. 
24 Conclusions from ordered probit regressions taking respectively the income and wealth levels as dependent 
variables and the variable indicating the highly educated category as an explanatory variable. 
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Table 4. The insider/outsider divide. 
 estimation Dependent variable Significant positive influence Significant negative 
influence 
Insider/outsider 
(excluded category: neither 
insider nor insider) 
probit No response  Insider, insider partner, 
former unemployed, 
outsider 
Ordered probit Ordered choice excluding no response Insider partner  
Probit  Binary choice: pro CTU  Insider partner 
probit Binary choice: contra CTU Insider, insider partner, 
former unemployed, poor, 18 
to 24 
 
Heckman two-
step probit 
Binary choice: pro CTU  Insider partner 
Continental insider/outsider 
(excluded category: neither 
insider nor insider) 
probit No response  Insider; outsider 
Ordered probit Ordered choice excluding no response  Insider* 
Probit  Binary choice: pro CTU   
probit Binary choice: contra CTU   
Heckman two-
step probit 
Binary choice: pro CTU Insider; outsider  
Southern insider/outsider 
(excluded category: neither 
insider nor insider) 
probit No response   
Ordered probit Ordered choice excluding no response  insider 
Probit  Binary choice: pro CTU Insider; outsider  
probit Binary choice: contra CTU   
Heckman two-
step probit 
Binary choice: pro CTU Insider  
“post-industrial class 
groups” (Excluded category: 
capital accumulators) 
probit No response  MSF; young SCP* 
Ordered probit Ordered choice excluding no response Young SCP  
Probit  Binary choice: pro CTU  Young SCP 
probit Binary choice: contra CTU Young SCP; MSF  
Heckman two-
step probit 
Binary choice: pro CTU  Young SCP 
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We turn now to the definitions proposed by Häusermann and Schwander (2009a, b). Results 
are summed up in Table 4. When one adopts the Continental welfare state characterisation, it turns 
out that both insiders and outsiders support the CTU more than other individuals. With the Southern 
welfare state characterisation, only insiders are distinguished, but again because they tend to 
support the CTU more than others. Regarding the definition according to the post-industrial class 
groups, the most robust result is that young (i.e. under 40) socio-cultural professionals (SCP) are 
opposed to the implementation of the CTU. This category has, according to Häusermann and 
Schwander’s (2009) classification, a strong outsider potential in Southern welfare states, but not in 
Continental ones. 
Häusermann and Schwander’s categories can be crossed with education and skills. The 
results of the regressions in Appendix Tables 12 to 15 can be summed up as follows. For both the 
Southern welfare state- and the continental welfare state-based definition, low education (i.e. under 
the baccalaureate level) outsiders as well as both low and high education insiders are more 
favourable to the CTU than other individuals. Taking the distinction in three degrees (strong, 
medium, low) of the outsider potential (see Table 2) in interaction with education, one obtains that 
low education strong outsider potential individuals and, more significantly, high education medium 
outsider potential individuals support the CTU more than others. Taking skills into account, one 
obtains that the categories the more favourable to the CTU are low-skill outsiders and both high- and 
low-skill insiders according to the Southern welfare state-based definition.25 
The conclusions one can draw from these results are: (i) some insiders tend to be favourable 
to the CTU, which contradicts most predictions taken from the insider/outsider literature; (ii) low 
education or low skill outsiders tend to support the CTU, which is what most insider/outsider 
theories would predict; (iii) high skill or education outsiders do not particularly support the CTU, 
which is not what could have expected on the basis of the insider/outsider literature. The outcome is 
therefore a partial confirmation of the insider/outsider predictions.  The differentiation of outsiders’ 
attitudes according to skills or education is somewhat surprising. The mechanism on which the CTU is 
based is to progressively grant protection to employees with job tenure. One could have expected 
that this progressive entry into a “pseudo-insider” status could have been perceived as beneficial by 
skilled outsiders, who could be confident in their ability to stay employed once they can get a job. On 
the other hand, the risk of staying in precarious jobs is certainly higher among low-skill outsiders, and 
the CTU would not enable them to eventually reach the pseudo-insider status. Therefore, one could 
have expected high-skill/education outsiders to be more favourable to the CTU than low-
skill/education outsiders, which is not what comes out of the estimations. 
A more precise characterisation of the socio-professional groups supporting the CTU may be 
obtained with the help of the INSEE-PCS 2003 classification. The support to the CTU comes from 
some high-skill categories (managers and high-skill employees of the private sector) and one low-skill 
group (personal services). The opposition to the CTU is mainly that of unskilled workers and, less 
significantly, skilled workers. As mentioned before, the age variable plays a role in the attitude 
towards the CTU. The previous estimations suggest that the age of 55 is a dividing line between pro- 
and anti-CTU. The INSEE categories are therefore interacted with age (under or over 55). Results with 
the categories interacted with age show a relatively clear pattern. For almost any skill level and many 
occupations in the public or the private sector, the categories favourable or not hostile to the CTU 
are populated with individuals over 55. Besides, the higher the skill level, the higher support to the 
CTU: managers and high-skill employees are markedly more in favour of the CTU than medium-skill 
                                                            
25 Results with the Continental welfare state-based definition are not significant. 
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workers. The exception is personal service workers,26 where the adhesion to the CTU can be 
observed both over and under 55. This group cannot be characterised as a strictly outsider group 
according to the definition based on employment status: there is no predominance of atypical 
contracts. According to our status-based definition, 32.5% of this group has the outsider status and 
54% the insider status. On the other hand, it would be defined as an outsider group when one adopts 
the definitions based on the type of welfare state (either continental or southern)27 and have 
predominantly a strong outsider potential according to the definition of Häusermann and Schwander 
(2009b).28 But the CTU is the only issue where personal service workers have the same policy 
expectations as the other pro-CTU groups. Otherwise, they have the same pattern of expectation as 
most other workers: for instance, they are mostly favourable to giving the priority to wages over 
competitiveness as an economic policy objective. One may note however that they tend to agree 
with the opinion that the unemployed could find a job if they wanted too, along with other workers 
as well as shopkeepers. They have also the same difficulties on the labour market as other low/mid-
skill private sector wage-earners: a higher propensity to have experienced unemployment. 
The consideration of the labour market risk variables (Appendix Table 18) reveals that the 
more an individual is confident about his or her possibility to find a new job after redundancy, the 
more he or she supports the CTU, which confirms that the employability of an individual makes her 
or him more supportive of labour market deregulation. 
Finally, results with the opinions and vote (Table 6) variable confirm the Right bias of the 
individuals in favour of the CTU. Individuals that do not think that the unemployed could easily find a 
job if they wanted to or who are worried about the consequences of European integration for the 
stability of the social protection system are opposed to the CTU whereas those who think that 
employment is a problem tend to support it. Last, opponents to the CTU are found among Left voters 
(i.e. respondents who voted for the main Left candidates at the first round of the 2012 presidential 
election: François Hollande and Jean-Luc Mélenchon) and respondents who consider themselves as 
Left or far Left. Including the Left-Right partisan variable itself (11 modalities) confirms that the more 
Right an individual considers himself or herself, the more supportive of the CTU he or she is 
(Appendix 21). 
To sum up, the first investigations reveal a series of cleavages relative to the CTU: age, 
income and wealth, skills or education or socio-professional categories which partly overlap with 
various definitions of the insider/outsider distinction, and political leanings or opinions. These 
cleavages are not independent from one another, individuals over 55 are more likely to lean towards 
the Right than other individuals, the same applies for the relatively skilled occupations of the private 
sector. As mentioned before, the various insider/outsider definitions do not lead to very clear 
conclusions. If anything, insiders, whatever the definition, or at least some of them, tend to support 
the CTU whereas the preferences of outsiders are more difficult to assess. The most informative 
differentiation of individuals is the one that crosses age with INSEE categories. Therefore, it will be 
the basis of the extended models which are presented in the next section. 
 
                                                            
26 This group is characterized as follows with respect to the ISCO88 classification: 3.5% group 4 (Office clerks); 
60.5% group 5 (protective and personal services workers); 36% group 9 (Sales and services elementary 
occupations). 
27 Close to 90% of that group have outsider statuses thus defined. 
28 It is also a predominantly female group (over 90%). 
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Table 5. Occupations 
 estimation Dependent variable Significant positive influence Significant negative influence 
Occupation 
(Excluded 
category: 
not 
classified) 
probit No response Low-skill workers Technicians; med. Skill private sector* 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered choice 
excluding no 
response 
Skilled and low-skill workers;  medium-skill 
public sector employees 
Managers and professionals; personal service employees 
Probit Binary choice: pro 
CTU 
Managers and professionals; personal 
service employees; high-skill public* and 
private sector 
Low-skill workers* 
probit Binary choice: 
contra CTU 
Skilled workers; medium-skill public 
sector employees* 
Managers and professionals; personal service 
employees 
Heckman 
two-step 
probit 
Binary choice: pro 
CTU 
Managers and professionals; high-skill 
private sector employees; personal service 
employees 
Skilled and unskilled workers 
Occupation 
interacted 
with age 
(Excluded 
category: 
not 
classified) 
probit No response Low-skill workers over 55; craftsmen and 
shopkeepers over 55; public sector clerks 
over 55; private sector clerks over 55 
Skilled worker under 55; private sector clerks under 55; 
technicians and associate professionals under 55 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered choice 
excluding no 
response 
medium-skill public sector employees 
under 55; skilled workers under 55 
managers and high-skill professionals over 55; high-skill 
private sector employees over 55; high-skill public sector 
employees over 55; farmers, craftsmen and shopkeepers 
over 55; personal services employees over 55; 
technicians and associate professionals over 55;  personal 
services employees under 55 
Probit Binary choice: pro 
CTU 
managers and high-skill professionals over 
55; high-skill private sector employees 
over 55; high-skill public sector employees 
over 55; farmers, craftsmen and 
shopkeepers over 55; personal services 
employees over 55; technicians and 
associate professionals over 55;  personal 
services employees under 55; private 
sector clerks over 55; medium-skill private 
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sector employees over 55; medium-skill 
public sector employees over 55;  public 
sector clerks over 55 
probit Binary choice: 
contra CTU 
skilled workers under 55; medium-skill 
public sector employees under 55; 
technicians and associate professionals 
under 55 
 
high-skill private sector employees over 55; high-skill 
public sector employees over 55; farmers, craftsmen 
and shopkeepers over 55; managers and high-skill 
professionals over 55; private sector clerks over 55; 
public sector clerks over 55; personal services 
employees over 55; technicians and associate 
professionals over 55;  personal services employees 
under 55; medium-skill private sector employees over 
55; medium-skill public sector employees over 55; 
Heckman 
two-step 
probit 
Binary choice: pro 
CTU 
high-skill private sector employees over 55; 
high-skill public sector employees over 55; 
farmers, craftsmen and shopkeepers over 
55; managers and high-skill professionals 
over 55; private sector clerks over 55; 
public sector clerks over 55; personal 
services employees over 55; technicians 
and associate professionals over 55;  
personal services employees under 55; 
medium-skill private sector employees 
over 55; medium-skill public sector 
employees over 55; 
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 estimation Dependent variable Significant positive influence Significant negative influence 
Opinions 
(excluded 
category: no 
answer) 
probit No response  Priority competitiveness; priority wages;  
important problem: French state vs. EU 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered choice 
excluding no 
response 
Disagree and strongly disagree to lazy unemployed; 
worried about European integration;  favourable to 
an increase in the number of civil servants 
Youth employment is an important problem; 
satisfaction level with Sarkozy’s action for youth 
employment 
Probit  Binary choice: pro 
CTU 
Youth employment is an important problem Disagree and strongly disagree to lazy 
unemployed; worried about European 
integration;  favourable to an increase in the 
number of civil servants 
probit Binary choice: 
contra CTU 
Disagree and strongly disagree to lazy unemployed; 
worried about European integration; favourable to 
an increase in the number of civil servants; 
important problem: number of civil servants;  
important problem: French state vs. EU 
Employment is an important problem 
Heckman 
two-step 
probit 
Binary choice: pro 
CTU 
Employment is an important problem Disagree and strongly disagree to lazy 
unemployed; worried about European 
integration 
Vote 
(excluded 
category: no 
vote) 
probit No response Refusal  to answer Mélenchon; Bayrou* 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered choice 
excluding no 
response 
J.L. Mélenchon; F. Hollande; P. Poutou*; refusal to 
answer* 
F. Bayrou; N. Sarkozy 
Probit  Binary choice: pro 
CTU 
F. Bayrou; N. Sarkozy; M. Le Pen Refusal to answer; J.L. Mélenchon* 
probit Binary choice: 
contra CTU 
J.L. Mélenchon; F. Hollande; P. Poutou  
Heckman 
two-step 
probit 
Binary choice: pro 
CTU 
 J.L. Mélenchon; F. Hollande 
Self-
positioning 
left/right 
probit No response  Far Left; left 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered choice 
excluding no 
 Significant negative coefficient with the ordered 
choice variable: the more (Right-) Left-wing the 
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Table 6. Opinions and votes 
 
(excluded 
category : no 
answer) 
response individual, the more (favourable) unfavourable 
to the CTU 
Probit  Binary choice: pro 
CTU 
Far right; right; centre  
probit Binary choice: 
contra CTU 
Far Left;  left; centre;  right*   
Heckman 
two-step 
probit 
Binary choice: pro 
CTU 
 Far Left;  left 
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5. Extended models 
To simplify matters, the extended models will focus on the dichotomised variable expressing 
support for the CTU. The estimation procedure is similar to the one adopted so far: only significant 
variables are introduced and kept in the models presented.29  
The model based on the interaction between age and socio-professional categories is extended to 
take into account the characteristics of individuals that have other types of activity: school, unemployed, 
retired, home duties. The possibility of a gender-specific influence is also considered by potentially 
reintroducing the corresponding variable. Also, since the presence of an insider partner was seen to be 
correlated with the opposition to the CTU, this variable is introduced too. Other variables possibly entering 
the model are those characterising some aspects of the insider/outsider divide: a dummy when the 
respondent says that he or she is having difficulties to make ends meet, dummies for the type of 
employment contract (open-end or fixed term) and whether it is an involuntary part-time job. 
A further extension considers the variables characterising labour market risk, i.e. whether it would 
be easy or difficult to find a new job in case of redundancy, and the appreciation of the role of European 
integration for the stability of the social protection system. Then, a third series of estimations will consider 
the possibility of introducing variables characterising the political leaning of the respondent and whether 
he or she is a trade union member. A fourth series adds the variables reflecting the opinion on the 
unemployed, i.e. whether the respondent think they could find a job easily if they really wanted to (four 
possibilities). The fifth series modifies how these latter variables are considered and reduces the number of 
variables to two (easy/difficult to find a job for an unemployed). 
Results are presented in Tables 7 to 11. Each table has three columns for, respectively, the 
estimation results with the whole sample, the restricted sample (respondents who expressed a positive or 
negative opinion on the CTU) and finally for the Heckman two-step estimation. 
Table 7 confirms the results previously obtained with the occupation and age variables, i.e. the 
support for the CTU among many social categories over 55. The importance of the insider partner as a 
support-decreasing factor can be noted. No importance of a specific gender effect not already incorporated 
in socio-professional differentiation is found. 
Table 7. Extended models 
 Probit probit Heckman 
 
   retired 0.176*** 0.267*** 0.155* 
 (0.068) (0.078) (0.080) 
managers over 55 1.360*** 1.177*** 1.095*** 
(0.344) (0.348) (0.325) 
high skill priv. Sect. 
Over 55 
0.623*** 0.702*** 0.711*** 
(0.166) (0.184) (0.174) 
high skill public over 
55 
0.496*** 0.584*** 0.587*** 
(0.164) (0.183) (0.173) 
unskilled workers 
under 55 
-0.355** 
  (0.168) 
  personal services 
under 55 
0.349** 0.426** 0.388** 
(0.163) (0.174) (0.167) 
personal services over 
55 
0.433** 0.491** 0.407** 
(0.197) (0.215) (0.205) 
                                                            
29 We also check that the correlation between explanatory variables does not exceed 0.3. 
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technicians over 55 0.410** 0.390** 0.402** 
(0.188) (0.195) (0.185) 
insider partner 
 
-0.182** -0.168** 
 
 
(0.085) (0.083) 
home duties 
 
0.385** 
 
 
 
(0.169) 
 
farmers over 55  
0.423** 0.347* 
 
(0.191) (0.182) 
constant -0.430*** -0.321*** -0.379*** 
 (0.040) (0.050) (0.050) 
selection equation 
   primary education 
over 65   
-0.819*** 
  
(0.110) 
secundary education 
over 65   
-0.527*** 
  
(0.148) 
prime age first level 
prof. Educ.    
-0.361** 
  
(0.157) 
prime age prof. Educ.   
0.518** 
  
(0.212) 
prime age tertiary 
educ. L   
0.551** 
  
(0.218) 
prime age higher prof. 
Educ.   
0.395** 
  
(0.193) 
woman 
  
-0.177** 
 
  
(0.082) 
former unemployed   
0.154* 
  
(0.088) 
insider 
  
0.161* 
 
  
(0.087) 
home duties   
-0.409** 
  
(0.180) 
constant 
  
1.240*** 
 
  
(0.107) 
athrho 
constant 
  
0.637** 
(0.258) 
Number of Obs 2014 1757 2014 
Number of censored observations 
 
257 
rho 
  
0.563 
p-value for comparison test 
 
0.013 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses 
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  The inclusion of opinion variables enriches the model. Individual not worried about the 
consequences of European integration for the social protection system are more favourable to the CTU 
than others. In contrast, respondents who are worried about that issue are opposed to the CTU.  
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Table 8. Extended model 
 
probit probit Heckman 
    not worried about Europe 
and social protection 
0.258*** 
  (0.068) 
  retired 0.143** 0.237*** 0.163* 
 
(0.071) (0.081) (0.089) 
managers over 55 1.252*** 1.091*** 1.045*** 
(0.349) (0.351) (0.339) 
high skill priv. Sect. Over 55 0.552*** 0.655*** 0.671*** 
(0.167) (0.186) (0.180) 
high skill public over 55 0.455*** 0.572*** 0.583*** 
(0.165) (0.186) (0.179) 
unskilled workers over 55 -0.348**   (0.169) 
  
personal services under 55 0.357** 0.447** 0.429** 
(0.164) (0.175) (0.171) 
personal services over 55 0.421** 0.529** 0.471** 
(0.199) (0.218) (0.214) 
technicians over 55 0.412** 0.421** 0.434** 
(0.187) (0.195) (0.188) 
insider partner -0.159* -0.186** -0.168** 
 
(0.082) (0.085) (0.085) 
 worried about Europe and 
social protection  
-0.279*** -0.272*** 
 
(0.071) (0.070) 
home duties 
 
0.428** 0.335* 
  
(0.171) (0.174) 
farmers over 55  
0.430** 0.378** 
 
(0.185) (0.180) 
clerk private sector Over 55  
0.291* 0.267* 
 
(0.155) (0.149) 
constant -0.460*** -0.134* -0.202*** 
 
(0.050) (0.069) (0.074) 
selection equation 
   
primary education over 65   
-0.834*** 
  
(0.110) 
secundary education over 
65   
-0.518*** 
  
(0.150) 
prime age first level prof. 
Educ.    
-0.353** 
  
(0.160) 
prime age prof. Educ.   
0.514** 
  
(0.213) 
prime age tertiary educ. L   
0.545** 
  
(0.221) 
prime age higher prof. 
Educ.   
0.389** 
  
(0.195) 
woman 
  
-0.176** 
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(0.084) 
former unemployed   
0.157* 
  
(0.089) 
insider 
  
0.163* 
 
  
(0.087) 
home duties   
-0.340* 
  
(0.184) 
constant 
  
1.237*** 
   
(0.107) 
athrho 
  
0.482* 
Constant 
  
(0.278) 
Number of Obs 2014 1757 2014 
Number of censored observations 
 
257 
rho 
  
0.448 
p-value for comparison test 
  
0.083 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  The following estimations do not change the previous results but add a political dimension to the 
attitude towards the CTU (Table 9). The more left the individual, the more opposed to the CTU, as was 
found previously. One may note that the unemployed seem to be favourable to the CTU with this 
specification. 
Table 9. Extended models 
 
probit probit Heckman 
    not worried about 
Europe and social 
protection 
0.257*** 
  
(0.068) 
  retired 0.129* 0.302*** 0.242*** 
 
(0.072) (0.080) (0.085) 
managers over 55 1.244*** 1.044*** 0.970*** 
(0.345) (0.349) (0.334) 
high skill priv. Sect. Over 
55 
0.568*** 0.587*** 0.581*** 
(0.167) (0.188) (0.180) 
high skill public over 55 0.454*** 0.599*** 0.589*** 
(0.166) (0.184) (0.177) 
unskilled workers over 55 -0.333**   (0.168) 
  far Right 0.220** 
  
 
(0.091) 
  personal services under 
55 
0.370** 0.421** 0.397** 
(0.164) (0.177) (0.173) 
insider partner -0.170** -0.178** -0.161* 
 
(0.081) (0.086) (0.085) 
technicians over 55 0.423** 0.428** 0.418** 
(0.187) (0.196) (0.189) 
personal services over 55 0.404** 0.519** 0.439** 
(0.200) (0.219) (0.213) 
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 worried about Europe 
and social protection  
-0.249*** -0.245*** 
 
(0.071) (0.069) 
far Left 
 
-0.316*** -0.310*** 
  
(0.088) (0.086) 
Left 
 
-0.224*** -0.220*** 
  
(0.082) (0.079) 
home duties 
 
0.437** 0.334* 
  
(0.171) (0.172) 
unemployed 
 
0.260** 0.254** 
  
(0.130) (0.127) 
farmers over 55  
0.360* 
 
 
(0.186) 
 constant -0.483*** -0.062 -0.125 
 
(0.052) (0.075) (0.079) 
selection equation 
   primary education over 
65   
-0.829*** 
  
(0.110) 
secundary education over 
65   
-0.527*** 
  
(0.149) 
prime age first level prof. 
Educ.    
-0.350** 
  
(0.160) 
prime age prof. Educ.   
0.520** 
  
(0.213) 
prime age tertiary educ. L   
0.544** 
  
(0.220) 
prime age higher prof. 
Educ.   
0.395** 
  
(0.194) 
woman 
  
-0.173** 
 
  
(0.083) 
former unemployed   
0.160* 
  
(0.088) 
insider 
  
0.167* 
 
  
(0.087) 
home duties   
-0.339* 
  
(0.183) 
constant 
  
1.231*** 
   
(0.107) 
athrho 
constant   
0.508** 
 
  
(0.242) 
Number of Obs 2014 1757 2014 
Number of censored observations 
 
257 
rho 
  
0.468 
p-value for comparison test 
 
0.036 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  As can be seen in Table 10, the opinion about the unemployed is also correlated with the attitude 
towards the CTU, in a rather unsurprising way: individuals who disagree with the statement that the 
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unemployed could find a job if they really wanted to are not favourable to the CTU.  One may note that the 
variables representing the personal service workers become less significant when the variables expressing 
the opinion about the unemployed are introduced. 
Table 10. Extended models 
 
probit probit Heckman 
    not worried about Europe 
and social protection 
0.250*** 
  (0.068) 
  retired 0.166** 0.322*** 0.209** 
 
(0.070) (0.079) (0.087) 
lazy unemployed: strongly 
disagree 
-
0.413*** -0.456*** -0.433*** 
(0.086) (0.094) (0.093) 
managers over 55 1.296*** 1.004*** 1.015*** 
(0.358) (0.367) (0.354) 
high skill priv. Sect. Over 
55 
0.545*** 0.541*** 0.605*** 
(0.169) (0.188) (0.182) 
high skill public over 55 0.547*** 0.577*** 0.628*** 
(0.165) (0.186) (0.180) 
lazy unemployed:  
disagree 
-
0.228*** -0.261*** -0.247*** 
(0.070) (0.075) (0.074) 
unskilled workers over 55 -0.382**   (0.172) 
  unemployed 0.263** 0.296** 0.289** 
 
(0.122) (0.130) (0.128) 
technicians over 55 0.424**  
0.391** 
(0.190) 
 
(0.192) 
personal services over 55 0.395**  
0.372* 
(0.198) 
 
(0.215) 
 worried about Europe 
and social protection  
-0.263*** -0.258*** 
 
(0.072) (0.070) 
insider partner  
-0.199** -0.181** 
 
(0.085) (0.085) 
skilled worker under 55  -0.309** -0.284** 
 (0.140) (0.138) 
home duties 
 
0.407** 0.330* 
  
(0.169) (0.173) 
far Left 
 
-0.169* -0.170** 
  
(0.086) (0.084) 
personal services under 
55  
0.332* 0.327* 
 
(0.173) (0.170) 
constant 
-
0.360*** 0.084 0.001 
 
(0.057) (0.082) (0.089) 
selection equation 
   primary education over 
65   
-0.865*** 
  
(0.111) 
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secundary education over 
65   
-0.550*** 
  
(0.150) 
prime age first level prof. 
Educ.    
-0.371** 
  
(0.160) 
prime age prof. Educ.   
0.556*** 
  
(0.213) 
prime age tertiary educ. L   
0.543** 
  
(0.221) 
prime age higher prof. 
Educ.   
0.417** 
  
(0.197) 
woman   
-0.160* 
  
(0.083) 
insider   
0.149* 
  
(0.085) 
home duties   
-0.342* 
  
(0.185) 
constant 
  
1.295*** 
   
(0.098) 
athrho 
  
0.443* 
constant 
  
(0.244) 
Number of Obs 2014 1757 2014 
Number of censored 
observations 
 
257 
rho 
  
0.416 
p-value for comparison test 
 
0.069 
Note: Standard errors in 
parentheses 
  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01 
  This finding is confirmed in Table 11 where the opinion about the unemployed is dichotomised by 
regrouping the strongly disagree (agree) and disagree (agree) together.30  
Table 11. Extended models 
 
probit probit Heckman 
     unemployed: lazy 0.314*** 
  
 
(0.063) 
  not worried about Europe and 
social protection 
0.244*** 
  (0.068) 
  retired 0.169** 0.276*** 0.166** 
 
(0.070) (0.081) (0.083) 
managers over 55 1.335*** 1.044*** 0.993*** 
(0.354) (0.362) (0.342) 
high skill public over 55 0.557*** 0.645*** 0.650*** 
(0.165) (0.185) (0.177) 
high skill priv. Sect. Over 55 0.560*** 0.579*** 0.601*** 
(0.170) (0.190) (0.181) 
                                                            
30 To avoid including variables with a joint correlation coefficient over 0.3. 
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unskilled workers over 55 -0.383**   (0.172) 
  
technicians over 55 0.425** 0.406** 0.422** 
(0.189) (0.196) (0.189) 
unemployed 0.260** 0.296** 0.268** 
 
(0.122) (0.130) (0.126) 
personal services over 55 0.391** 0.445** 0.367* 
(0.198) (0.217) (0.210) 
unemployed: not lazy 
 
-0.297*** -0.278*** 
  
(0.069) (0.068) 
 worried about Europe and 
social protection  
-0.246*** -0.232*** 
 
(0.072) (0.069) 
home duties 
 
0.405** 
 
  
(0.169) 
 insider partner 
 
-0.187** -0.175** 
  
(0.086) (0.084) 
personal services under 55  
0.338* 0.305* 
 
(0.175) (0.169) 
far Left 
 
-0.257*** -0.249*** 
  
(0.089) (0.086) 
skilled worker under 55  
-0.300** -0.296** 
 
(0.140) (0.136) 
Left 
 
-0.168** -0.160** 
  
(0.083) (0.080) 
constant -0.655*** 0.104 0.029 
 
(0.053) (0.084) (0.087) 
selection equation 
   
primary education over 65   
-0.852*** 
  
(0.112) 
secundary education over 65   
-0.550*** 
  
(0.148) 
prime age first level prof. 
Educ.    
-0.369** 
  
(0.158) 
prime age prof. Educ.   
0.558*** 
  
(0.212) 
prime age tertiary educ. L   
0.548** 
  
(0.220) 
prime age higher prof. Educ.   
0.420** 
  
(0.194) 
woman   
-0.159* 
  
(0.082) 
insider   
0.147* 
  
(0.085) 
home duties   
-0.408** 
  
(0.182) 
constant 
  
1.296*** 
   
(0.097) 
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athrho 
  
0.569** 
constant 
  
(0.242) 
Number of Obs 2014 1757 2014 
Number of censored observations 
 
257 
rho 
  
0.515 
p-value for comparison test 
  
0.019 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01 
   
6. Conclusion  
This article has analysed the determinants of individual attitudes towards a significant labour 
market reform: the substitution of the CTU, a unique labour contract with limited protection increasing 
with tenure, to both open-end and fixed-term contracts. The insider/outsider theories would predict that 
insiders would oppose such a reform whereas outsiders would welcome it. Beyond the theoretical and 
empirical problems associated with the definition and identification of insiders and outsiders, the results of 
the various estimations do not bring an overwhelming support for the insider/outsider theories. Positive 
attitudes towards the CTU come mostly from individuals that would broadly be defined as insiders: they are 
wealthy, senior, have medium or high education/skill levels or responsibility positions in the public or the 
private sector, they are confident about their employability or are not likely to be affected themselves by 
any labour market reform (they are retired for instance). These characteristics identify groups close to the 
Right electorate. Indeed, Left voters express a dislike of the CTU and more generally, the differentiation of 
pro- and anti-CTU can be analysed in relation with a certain number of opinions that define a broad 
Left/Right cleavage: the danger that European integration could represent for the welfare state, the 
willingness to work of the unemployed, etc. These findings are compatible with the fact that the 
proposition of a CTU has been carried by Right or Centre-Right parties so far.  
Some elements of the insider/outsider theories receive some support in the data. For instance, 
individuals that have an insider partner tend to have negative opinions of the CTU. Also, some groups that 
can be defined as outsiders do support the CTU: possibly the unemployed but above all the personal 
services workers. This group cannot be considered as an outsider group according to the employment 
status, but other definitions of the outsider status such as those of Häusermann and Schwander (2009a, b) 
would have that group classified among the outsiders. However, characterisations in terms of insiders or 
outsiders, whether based on the employment status or defined such as in Häusermann and Schwander 
(2009a, b) are not precise enough to identify the groups favourable to a labour market liberalisation reform 
such as the CTU.  
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Appendix. Regression results 
1. Age and gender 
 
no answer 
ordered 
probit pro contra pro contra Heckman 
        over 65 0.591*** -0.428*** 0.272*** -0.582*** 0.547*** -0.547*** 0.324*** 
 
(0.089) (0.065) (0.069) (0.085) (0.077) (0.077) (0.101) 
woman 0.200** 
  
-0.115* 
   
 
(0.082) 
  
(0.061) 
   35-44 -0.293** 
  
0.167* 
   
 
(0.125) 
  
(0.095) 
   25-34 -0.298** 
  
0.249** 
   
 
(0.147) 
  
(0.108) 
   55-64 
 
-0.346*** 0.383*** -0.304*** 0.430*** -0.430*** 0.379*** 
  
(0.073) (0.079) (0.091) (0.082) (0.082) (0.080) 
constant -1.392*** 
 
-0.445*** 0.186*** -0.369*** 0.369*** -0.441*** 
 
(0.085) 
 
(0.043) (0.071) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) 
cut1 
       constant 
 
-1.500*** 
     
  
(0.054) 
     cut2 
       constant 
 
-0.328*** 
     
  
(0.040) 
     cut3 
       constant 
 
0.568*** 
     
  
(0.040) 
     selection 
equation 
       woman 
      
-0.198** 
       
(0.080) 
25-34 
      
0.324** 
       
(0.144) 
35-44 
      
0.304** 
       
(0.123) 
over 65 
      
-0.581*** 
       
(0.089) 
constant 
      
1.381*** 
       
(0.085) 
athrho 
      
0.895** 
constant 
      
(0.409) 
Number of 
Obs 2014 1757 2014 2014 1757 1757 2014 
Number of censored observations 
    
257 
rho 
      
0.714 
p-value for 
comparison 
test 
      
0.029 
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     
2. Source of household income 
 
no answer 
ordered 
probit pro contra pro contra Heckman 
        wages -0.606*** 0.203* 
 
0.315*** -0.213* 0.213* 
 
 
(0.079) (0.105) 
 
(0.111) (0.117) (0.117) 
 pensions 
 
-0.209* 0.293*** -0.325*** 0.317*** -0.317*** 0.327*** 
  
(0.110) (0.061) (0.114) (0.121) (0.121) (0.071) 
property income -0.803* 
 
-1.235** 1.198* -1.198* 1.031** 
  
(0.470) 
 
(0.549) (0.611) (0.611) (0.491) 
constant -0.884*** 
 
-0.408*** -0.067 -0.150 0.150 -0.416*** 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.039) (0.103) (0.109) (0.109) (0.039) 
cut1 
       constant 
 
-1.295*** 
     
  
(0.107) 
     cut2 
       constant 
 
-0.120 
     
  
(0.101) 
     cut3 
       constant 
 
0.774*** 
     
  
(0.101) 
     selection 
equation 
       Wages as 
main source 
of income 
      
0.613*** 
       
(0.079) 
woman 
      
-0.160** 
       
(0.078) 
constant 
      
0.968*** 
       
(0.072) 
athrho 
      
1.126** 
constant 
      
(0.460) 
Number of 
Obs 2014 1757 2014 2014 1757 1757 2014 
Number of censored observations 
    
257 
rho 
      
0.810 
p-value for comparison test 
    
0.014 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     
3. Type of activity 
 
no answer ordered logit pro contra pro contra Heckmann 
retired 0.581*** -0.321*** 0.293*** -0.587*** 0.497*** -0.497*** 0.375*** 
 (0.081) (0.059) (0.063) (0.065) (0.070) (0.070) (0.078) 
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home duties 0.709*** -0.286** 
 
-0.542*** 0.388** -0.388** 
 
 (0.175) (0.146) 
 
(0.154) (0.169) (0.169) 
 school 0.408** 
      
 (0.196) 
      unemployed 
 
0.220* -0.229* 0.249** -0.249** 
 
 
  
(0.120) (0.119) (0.126) (0.126) 
 constant -1.444*** 
 
-0.418*** 0.218*** -0.350*** 0.350*** -0.375*** 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) 
cut1 
       constant 
 
-1.440*** 
     
  
(0.052) 
     cut2 
       constant 
 
-0.279*** 
     
  
(0.038) 
     cut3 
       constant 
 
0.611*** 
     
  
(0.039) 
     Selection 
equation 
       primary 
education over 
65 
      
-0.806*** 
      
(0.123) 
secundary 
education over 
65 
      
-0.570*** 
      
(0.156) 
prime age first 
level prof. 
Educ. 
      
-0.364** 
      
(0.166) 
prime age prof. 
Educ.       
0.450** 
      
(0.213) 
prime age 
tertiary educ. L       
0.488** 
      
(0.223) 
prime age 
higher prof. 
Educ. 
      
0.340* 
      
(0.196) 
woman 
      
-0.167* 
 
      
(0.086) 
former 
unemployed       
0.154* 
      
(0.092) 
insider 
      
0.133 
 
      
(0.093) 
home duties       
-0.398** 
      
(0.192) 
constant 
      
1.311*** 
       
(0.117) 
athrho 
      
0.556** 
constant 
      
(0.267) 
Number of Obs 2014 1757 2014 2014 1757 1757 1916 
Number of censored observations 
    
223 
rho 
      
0.505 
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p-value for comparison test 
    
0.038 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     
 
 
4. Wealth 
 
no answer 
ordered 
probit pro contra pro contra Heckman 
        
refuse to answer 0.711*** -0.239**  
-0.424*** 
   (0.119) (0.108) 
 
(0.124) 
   
unknown wealth 0.541***   
-0.258*** 
   (0.101) 
  
(0.093) 
   
wealth over 300K  
-0.314*** 0.308*** -0.262*** 0.249*** -0.249*** 0.302*** 
 
(0.070) (0.082) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.077) 
wealth 150-300K    
0.147* -0.173** 0.173** 
 
   
(0.080) (0.079) (0.079) 
 
wealth 75-150K        
       constant -1.357*** 
 
-0.363*** 0.094** -0.187*** 0.187*** -0.362*** 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.033) (0.047) (0.041) (0.041) (0.033) 
cut1 
       constant 
 
-1.403*** 
     
  
(0.048) 
     cut2 
       constant 
 
-0.250*** 
     
  
(0.036) 
     cut3 
       constant 
 
0.638*** 
     
  
(0.037) 
     selection 
equation 
       refuse to answer 
      
-0.583*** 
       
(0.111) 
unknown wealth 
      
-0.462*** 
       
(0.099) 
woman 
      
-0.162** 
       
(0.077) 
over 65 
      
-0.718*** 
       
(0.075) 
constant 
      
1.623*** 
       
(0.071) 
athrho 
      
2.216*** 
constant 
      
(0.777) 
Number of Obs 2014 1757 2014 2014 1757 1757 2014 
Number of censored observations 
    
257 
rho 
      
0.977 
p-value for comparison test 
     
0.004 
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
      5. Income 
 
no answer 
ordered 
probit pro contra pro contra Heckman 
        decile 9 -0.520*** 
  
0.233** 
   
 
(0.161) 
  
(0.106) 
   decile 8 -0.326** 
  
0.179* 
   
 
(0.140) 
  
(0.100) 
   decile 3 -0.334* 0.268*** 
 
0.340*** -0.255* 0.255* 
 
 
(0.177) (0.103) 
 
(0.124) (0.131) (0.131) 
 decile 7 -0.322* 
      
 
(0.186) 
      decile 10 
 
-0.342*** 0.376*** -0.276** 0.369*** -0.369*** 0.320*** 
  
(0.092) (0.111) (0.114) (0.118) (0.118) (0.100) 
decile 5 
 
-0.266** 0.321** -0.247* 0.323** -0.323** 0.292** 
  
(0.118) (0.134) (0.136) (0.142) (0.142) (0.122) 
decile 2 
  
0.168* 
    
   
(0.092) 
    constant -1.125*** 
 
-0.401*** 0.016 -0.238*** 0.238*** -0.372*** 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.038) (0.042) (0.038) (0.038) (0.034) 
cut1 
       constant 
 
-1.373*** 
     
  
(0.051) 
     cut2 
       constant 
 
-0.232*** 
     
  
(0.037) 
     cut3 
       constant 
 
0.678*** 
     
  
(0.039) 
     selection 
equation 
       decile 3 
      
0.219 
       
(0.175) 
decile 7 
      
0.312* 
       
(0.187) 
decile 8 
      
0.320** 
       
(0.140) 
decile 9 
      
0.470*** 
       
(0.166) 
woman 
      
-0.187** 
       
(0.085) 
over 65 
      
-0.715*** 
       
(0.082) 
constant 
      
1.434*** 
       
(0.086) 
athrho 
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constant 
      
1.852*** 
       
(0.347) 
Number of Obs 1842 1633 1842 1842 1633 1633 1842 
Number of censored observations 
    
209 
rho 
      
0.952 
p-value for comparison test 
    
0.000 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     6. Education  
 
no answer 
ordered 
probit pro contra pro contra Heckman 
        primary 0.789*** -0.241*** 
 
-0.684*** 0.353*** -0.353*** 
 
 
(0.098) (0.091) 
 
(0.093) (0.097) (0.097) 
 secundary 0.261** -0.206*** 0.215*** -0.470*** 0.332*** -0.332*** 0.216*** 
 
(0.106) (0.072) (0.078) (0.088) (0.086) (0.086) (0.078) 
professional -0.350** 
      
 
(0.165) 
      
higher 
professional -0.328** 0.156* 
     
 
(0.160) (0.084) 
     
tertiary M & 
D  
-0.195** 0.285*** -0.447*** 0.358*** -0.358*** 0.321*** 
 
(0.086) (0.093) (0.103) (0.101) (0.101) (0.091) 
first level 
professional 
   
-0.183** 
   
    
(0.083) 
   constant -1.326*** 
 
-0.390*** 0.284*** -0.325*** 0.325*** -0.394*** 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.037) (0.056) (0.043) (0.043) (0.037) 
cut1 
       constant 
 
-1.408*** 
     
  
(0.059) 
     cut2 
       constant 
 
-0.250*** 
     
  
(0.045) 
     cut3 
       constant 
 
0.638*** 
     
  
(0.045) 
     selection 
equation 
       Primary ed. 
      
-0.514*** 
       
(0.102) 
Secundary ed. 
      
-0.242** 
       
(0.106) 
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Professional 
ed. 
      
0.261 
       
(0.164) 
woman 
      
-0.162** 
       
(0.077) 
over 65 
      
-0.553*** 
       
(0.085) 
constant 
      
1.553*** 
       
(0.081) 
athrho 
      
1.819 
constant 
      
(1.575) 
Number of 
Obs 2014 1757 2014 2014 1757 1757 2014 
Number of censored observations 
    
257 
rho 
      
0.949 
p-value for comparison test 
    
0.248 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     7. Education and age 
 
no answer 
ordered 
probit pro contra pro contra Heckman 
        primary over 
65 
0.902*** 
 
-0.264*** -0.332*** 
  
-0.263** 
(0.103) 
 
(0.096) (0.101) 
  
(0.110) 
secundary 
over 65 
0.530*** 
  
-0.302** 
   (0.150) 
  
(0.139) 
   first level 
professional 
over 65 
0.355** 
      
(0.161) 
      prime age 
professional 
-0.520** 0.324** -0.304** 0.524*** -0.459*** 0.459*** -0.390*** 
(0.212) (0.137) (0.137) (0.135) (0.139) (0.139) (0.134) 
prime age 
tertiary L 
-0.487** 0.500*** -0.483*** 0.687*** -0.640*** 0.640*** -0.564*** 
(0.215) (0.123) (0.140) (0.138) (0.143) (0.143) (0.138) 
prime age 
higher 
professional 
-0.384** 0.443*** -0.427*** 0.607*** -0.573*** 0.573*** -0.496*** 
(0.190) (0.095) (0.136) (0.133) (0.139) (0.139) (0.135) 
prime age 
first level 
professional 
 
0.365*** -0.361*** 0.478*** -0.482*** 0.482*** -0.407*** 
 
(0.080) (0.094) (0.099) (0.097) (0.097) (0.095) 
young higher 
professional  
0.664*** -0.623** 0.820*** -0.783** 0.783** -0.692** 
 
(0.221) (0.303) (0.293) (0.308) (0.308) (0.299) 
young tertiary 
level M & D  
0.791*** 
 
0.794*** -0.913*** 0.913*** -0.659*** 
 
(0.178) 
 
(0.231) (0.239) (0.239) (0.226) 
tertiary M & 
D over 55  
-0.514*** 
 
-0.564*** 0.667*** -0.667*** 0.478** 
 
(0.163) 
 
(0.211) (0.219) (0.219) (0.199) 
young 
professional    
0.624** -0.593* 0.593* -0.511* 
   
(0.299) (0.309) (0.309) (0.298) 
constant -1.281*** 
 
-0.154*** -0.164*** 0.034 -0.034 -0.111** 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.039) (0.046) (0.043) (0.043) (0.046) 
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cut1 
       constant 
 
-1.193*** 
     
  
(0.048) 
     cut2 
       constant 
 
-0.015 
     
  
(0.040) 
     cut3 
       constant 
 
0.888*** 
     
  
(0.044) 
     selection 
equation 
       
woman       
-0.146* 
      
(0.079) 
primary 
education       
-0.472*** 
      
(0.092) 
home duties       
-0.494*** 
      
(0.166) 
over 65       
-0.536*** 
      
(0.081) 
constant 
      
1.533*** 
       
(0.074) 
athrho 
       constant 
      
1.200* 
       
(0.649) 
Number of 
Obs 1991 1757 2014 2014 1757 1757 2014 
Number of censored observations 
    
257 
rho 
      
0.834 
p-value for comparison test 
    
0.064 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
      
 
8. Insider/outsider 
 
no answer ordered logit pro contra pro contra Heckmann 
        former 
unemployed 
-0.287*** 
  
0.119* 
   (0.084) 
  
(0.065) 
   
insider partner 
-0.316*** 0.240*** -0.224*** 0.376*** -0.311*** 0.311*** -0.239*** 
(0.110) (0.062) (0.077) (0.076) (0.080) (0.080) (0.076) 
insider -0.238*** 
  
0.162** 
   
 
(0.084) 
  
(0.067) 
   outsider -0.207* 
      
 
(0.119) 
      poor 
   
0.119* 
   
    
(0.067) 
   18 to 24 
   
0.249** 
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(0.122) 
   constant -0.859*** 
 
-0.270*** -0.278*** -0.117*** 0.117*** -0.259*** 
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.034) (0.067) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
cut1 
       constant 
 
-1.285*** 
     
  
(0.046) 
     cut2 
       constant 
 
-0.130*** 
     
  
(0.035) 
     cut3 
       constant 
 
0.753*** 
     
  
(0.038) 
     Selection 
equation 
       former 
unemployed       
0.163* 
      
(0.086) 
insider 
      
0.194** 
       
(0.085) 
primary 
education       
-0.370*** 
      
(0.105) 
home duties       
-0.366** 
      
(0.173) 
woman 
      
-0.146* 
       
(0.079) 
over 65 
      
-0.587*** 
       
(0.087) 
constant 
      
1.349*** 
       
(0.106) 
athrho 
      
1.122*** 
constant 
      
(0.271) 
Number of Obs 2014 1757 2014 2014 1757 1757 2014 
Number of censored observations 
    
257 
rho 
      
0.808 
p-value for comparison test 
    
0.000 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     9. Insider/outsider according to Häusermann and Schwander: continental welfare state 
 
no answer ordered logit pro contra pro contra Heckmann 
        continental 
insider 
-0.294*** -0.104* 
    
0.199** 
(0.113) (0.055) 
    
(0.097) 
continental 
outsider 
-0.245** 
     
0.187* 
(0.121) 
     
(0.103) 
constant -0.947*** 
 
-0.315*** 0.012 -0.184*** 0.184*** -0.485*** 
 
(0.101) 
 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.089) 
cut1 
       constant 
 
-1.392*** 
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(0.056) 
     cut2 
       constant 
 
-0.245*** 
     
  
(0.046) 
     cut3 
       constant 
 
0.636*** 
     
  
(0.048) 
     selection 
equation 
       woman 
      
-0.143* 
       
(0.079) 
over 65 
      
-0.798*** 
       
(0.074) 
home duties 
     
-0.456*** 
       
(0.159) 
constant 
      
1.511*** 
       
(0.073) 
athrho 
       constant 
      
1.821*** 
       
(0.390) 
Number of Obs 2014 1757 2014 2014 1757 1757 2014 
Number of censored observations 
    
257 
rho 
      
0.949 
p-value for comparison test 
    
0.000 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
      
10. Insider/outsider according to Häusermann and Schwander: Southern welfare state 
 
 
no answer 
ordered 
probit pro contra pro contra Heckman 
        
southern 
insider 
-0.145** 0.274*** 
  
0.143** -0.143** 0.125** 
(0.058) (0.098) 
  
(0.068) (0.068) (0.062) 
southern 
outsider  
0.191* 
     
 
(0.112) 
     constant 
 
-0.534*** 0.012 -1.181*** -0.276*** 0.276*** -0.396*** 
  
(0.091) (0.030) (0.038) (0.056) (0.056) (0.052) 
cut1 
       constant -1.426*** 
      
 
(0.061) 
      cut2 
       constant -0.278*** 
      
 
(0.050) 
      cut3 
       constant 0.604*** 
      
 
(0.051) 
      selection 
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equation 
woman 
      
-0.155** 
       
(0.078) 
over 65 
      
-0.791*** 
       
(0.074) 
home duties 
     
-0.445*** 
       
(0.159) 
constant 
      
1.516*** 
       
(0.072) 
athrho 
       constant 
      
1.807*** 
       
(0.386) 
Number of Obs 1757 2014 2014 2014 1757 1757 2014 
Number of censored observations 
    
257 
rho 
      
0.948 
p-value for comparison test 
    
0.000 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
      
11. Insider/outsider according to Häusermann and Schwander: post-industrial  class groups 
 
 
no answer 
ordered 
probit pro contra pro contra Heckman 
        MSF -0.220** 
  
0.159* 
   
 
(0.109) 
  
(0.085) 
   young SCP -0.377* 0.337*** -0.284** 0.433*** -0.364** 0.364** -0.302** 
 
(0.196) (0.111) (0.143) (0.138) (0.147) (0.147) (0.140) 
constant -1.134*** 
 
-0.298*** -0.037 -0.160*** 0.160*** -0.296*** 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) 
cut1 
       constant 
 
-1.312*** 
     
  
(0.045) 
     cut2 
       constant 
 
-0.161*** 
     
  
(0.033) 
     cut3 
       constant 
 
0.722*** 
     
  
(0.035) 
     selection 
equation 
       MSF 
      
0.224** 
       
(0.106) 
woman 
      
-0.157** 
       
(0.077) 
over 65 
      
-0.784*** 
       
(0.074) 
home duties 
     
-0.433*** 
       
(0.160) 
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constant 
      
1.489*** 
       
(0.074) 
athrho 
       constant 
      
1.737*** 
       
(0.477) 
Number of Obs 2014 1757 2014 2014 1757 1757 2014 
Number of censored observations 
    
257 
rho 
      
0.940 
p-value for comparison test 
    
0.000 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     
 
        12. Insider/outsider according to Häusermann and Schwander: continental welfare state and 
education 
 
       
 
no answer 
ordered 
probit pro contra pro contra Heckman 
        
 outsider high 
educ. 
0.215** 
  
-0.301** 
   (0.084) 
  
(0.125) 
   
 outsider low 
educ. 
 
0.131* -0.224*** 
 
0.310*** -0.310*** 0.240*** 
 
(0.075) (0.081) 
 
(0.099) (0.099) (0.090) 
 insider low 
education   
-0.135** 
 
0.215** -0.215** 0.179** 
  
(0.067) 
 
(0.085) (0.085) (0.078) 
 insider high 
education    
-0.339*** 0.189* -0.189* 0.221** 
   
(0.106) (0.099) (0.099) (0.093) 
constant 
 
-0.338*** 0.100** -1.091*** -0.356*** 0.356*** -0.468*** 
  
(0.034) (0.046) (0.044) (0.068) (0.068) (0.064) 
cut1 
       constant -1.309*** 
      
 
(0.045) 
      cut2 
       constant -0.160*** 
      
 
(0.033) 
      cut3 
       constant 0.722*** 
      
 
(0.036) 
      selection equation 
       primary education 
over 65       
-0.804*** 
      
(0.101) 
secundary 
education over 65       
-0.589*** 
      
(0.140) 
prime age first 
level prof. Educ.        
-0.433*** 
      
(0.154) 
prime age prof. 
Educ.       
0.553*** 
      
(0.208) 
prime age tertiary 
educ. L       
0.589*** 
      
(0.212) 
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prime age higher 
prof. Educ.       
0.439** 
      
(0.187) 
woman 
      
-0.168** 
       
(0.080) 
former 
unemployed       
0.154* 
      
(0.085) 
insider 
      
0.156* 
       
(0.083) 
home duties       
-0.370** 
      
(0.167) 
constant 
      
1.228*** 
       
(0.102) 
athrho 
       constant 
      
1.388*** 
       
(0.516) 
Number of Obs 1757 2014 2014 2014 1757 1757 2014 
Number of censored observations 
    
257 
rho 
      
0.883 
p-value for comparison test 
     
0.007 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
       
 
 
 
13. Insider/outsider according to Häusermann and Schwander: southern welfare state and 
education 
 
 
no answer 
ordered 
probit pro contra pro contra Heckman 
        outsider high 
educ. 
0.384*** -0.274* 0.448*** -0.561*** -0.370** 0.370** 
 (0.111) (0.142) (0.137) (0.205) (0.144) (0.144) 
 insider high 
educ.    
-0.276*** 
  
0.319*** 
   
(0.092) 
  
(0.095) 
outsider low 
educ.       
0.285*** 
      
(0.101) 
insider low 
educ.       
0.268*** 
      
(0.085) 
constant 
 
-0.298*** -0.017 -1.091*** -0.159*** 0.159*** -0.544*** 
  
(0.031) (0.031) (0.044) (0.033) (0.033) (0.074) 
cut1 
       constant -1.309*** 
      
 
(0.045) 
      cut2 
       constant -0.157*** 
      
 
(0.033) 
      cut3 
       constant 0.726*** 
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(0.035) 
      selection 
equation 
       primary 
education over 
65 
      
-0.814*** 
      
(0.099) 
secundary 
education over 
65 
      
-0.598*** 
      
(0.139) 
prime age first 
level prof. 
Educ.  
      
-0.438*** 
      
(0.154) 
prime age prof. 
Educ.       
0.548*** 
      
(0.209) 
prime age 
tertiary educ. L       
0.597*** 
      
(0.212) 
prime age 
higher prof. 
Educ. 
      
0.435** 
      
(0.187) 
woman 
      
-0.167** 
       
(0.079) 
former 
unemployed       
0.151* 
      
(0.084) 
insider 
      
0.158* 
       
(0.082) 
home duties       
-0.357** 
      
(0.167) 
constant 
      
1.229*** 
       
(0.101) 
athrho 
       constant 
      
1.520*** 
       
(0.583) 
Number of Obs 1757 2014 2014 2014 1757 1757 2014 
Number of censored observations 
    
257 
rho 
      
0.909 
p-value for comparison test 
    
0.009 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
      
14. Insider/outsider according to Häusermann and Schwander: outsider potential and education 
 
 
no answer 
ordered 
probit pro contra pro contra Heckman 
        strong outsider 
high educ. 
0.202*** 
 
0.212** -0.346*** 
   (0.076) 
 
(0.089) (0.120) 
   medium 
outsider high 
educ. 
 
0.297** 
  
0.356** -0.356** 0.337** 
 
(0.141) 
  
(0.152) (0.152) (0.139) 
strong outsider 
low educ.  
0.152** 
  
0.226*** -0.226*** 0.128* 
 
(0.075) 
  
(0.086) (0.086) (0.073) 
low outsider 
   
-0.332*** 
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high educ. 
   
(0.123) 
   low outsider 
low educ.     
0.150** -0.150** 
 
    
(0.075) (0.075) 
 constant 
 
-0.356*** -0.015 -1.102*** -0.286*** 0.286*** -0.351*** 
  
(0.035) (0.032) (0.043) (0.049) (0.049) (0.035) 
cut1 
       constant -1.306*** 
      
 
(0.046) 
      cut2 
       constant -0.156*** 
      
 
(0.034) 
      cut3 
       constant 0.726*** 
      
 
(0.036) 
      selection 
equation 
       primary 
education over 
65 
      
-0.799*** 
      
(0.102) 
secundary 
education over 
65 
      
-0.604*** 
      
(0.140) 
prime age first 
level prof. 
Educ.  
      
-0.444*** 
      
(0.155) 
prime age prof. 
Educ.       
0.552*** 
      
(0.209) 
prime age 
tertiary educ. L       
0.598*** 
      
(0.211) 
prime age 
higher prof. 
Educ. 
      
0.435** 
      
(0.187) 
woman 
      
-0.163** 
       
(0.080) 
former 
unemployed       
0.157* 
      
(0.085) 
insider 
      
0.163** 
       
(0.083) 
home duties       
-0.400** 
      
(0.168) 
constant 
      
1.221*** 
       
(0.102) 
athrho 
       constant 
      
1.330*** 
       
(0.378) 
Number of Obs 1757 2014 2014 2014 1757 1757 2014 
Number of censored observations 
    
257 
rho 
      
0.869 
p-value for comparison test 
    
0.000 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
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* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     15. Insider/outsider according to Häusermann and Schwander:  southern welfare state and skills 
 
 
no answer 
ordered 
probit pro contra pro contra Heckman 
        southern 
outsider low 
skill 
0.337*** 
 
0.410*** -0.349* -0.253* 0.253* 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.138) (0.196) (0.154) (0.154) 
 southern 
insider low skill  
0.315*** 
  
0.172** -0.172** 0.300*** 
 
(0.088) 
  
(0.074) (0.074) (0.086) 
southern 
outsider high 
skill 
 
0.298*** 
  
0.167* -0.167* 0.268*** 
 
(0.106) 
  
(0.096) (0.096) (0.102) 
southern 
insider high 
skill 
 
0.227** 
    
0.191** 
 
(0.101) 
    
(0.097) 
constant 
 
-0.549*** -0.014 -1.162*** -0.271*** 0.271*** -0.529*** 
  
(0.076) (0.031) (0.038) (0.057) (0.057) (0.075) 
cut1 
       constant -1.312*** 
      
 
(0.045) 
      cut2 
       constant -0.161*** 
      
 
(0.033) 
      cut3 
       constant 0.722*** 
      
 
(0.035) 
      selection 
equation 
       primary 
education over 
65 
      
-0.821*** 
      
(0.098) 
secundary 
education over 
65 
      
-0.595*** 
      
(0.139) 
prime age first 
level prof. 
Educ.  
      
-0.445*** 
      
(0.154) 
prime age prof. 
Educ.       
0.542*** 
      
(0.209) 
prime age 
tertiary educ. L       
0.596*** 
      
(0.211) 
prime age 
higher prof. 
Educ. 
      
0.434** 
      
(0.186) 
woman 
      
-0.162** 
       
(0.079) 
former 
unemployed       
0.146* 
      
(0.085) 
insider 
      
0.154* 
       
(0.082) 
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home duties       
-0.345** 
      
(0.168) 
constant 
      
1.232*** 
       
(0.101) 
athrho 
       constant 
      
1.466*** 
       
(0.514) 
Number of Obs 1757 2014 2014 2014 1757 1757 2014 
Number of censored observations 
    
257 
rho 
      
0.899 
p-value for comparison test 
    
0.004 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
      
16. Occupations: INSEE PCS 2003 classification 
 
 
no answer 
ordered 
probit pro contra pro contra Heckman 
        unskilled 
workers 
0.300** 0.270** -0.235* 
   
-0.292** 
(0.127) (0.107) (0.120) 
   
(0.121) 
technicians 
-0.411** 
      (0.192) 
      medium-skill 
private sector  
-0.388* 
      (0.211) 
      personal 
services 
employees 
 
-0.288** 0.350*** -0.262** 0.396*** -0.396*** 0.279** 
 
(0.114) (0.127) (0.129) (0.135) (0.135) (0.119) 
medium-skill 
public sector   
0.277*** 
 
0.192* 
   
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.107) 
   
skilled workers  
0.209** 
 
0.221** 
  
-0.165* 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.091) 
  
(0.091) 
managers   
-0.419** 0.952*** -0.736*** 0.958*** -0.958*** 0.640*** 
 
(0.208) (0.269) (0.277) (0.280) (0.280) (0.211) 
high-skill 
private sector    
0.310** 
 
0.302** -0.302** 0.220* 
  
(0.122) 
 
(0.128) (0.128) (0.113) 
high-skill public 
sector    
0.209* 
 
0.243** -0.243** 
 
  
(0.115) 
 
(0.123) (0.123) 
 constant -1.173*** 
 
-0.362*** -0.009 -0.251*** 0.251*** -0.314*** 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) 
cut1 
       constant 
 
-1.296*** 
     
  
(0.050) 
     cut2 
       constant 
 
-0.137*** 
     
  
(0.038) 
     cut3 
       constant 
 
0.752*** 
     
  
(0.040) 
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selection 
equation 
       MSF 
      
0.206* 
       
(0.107) 
woman 
      
-0.145* 
       
(0.079) 
over 65 
      
-0.784*** 
       
(0.074) 
home duties 
     
-0.481*** 
       
(0.161) 
unskilled worker 
     
-0.311** 
       
(0.134) 
constant 
      
1.514*** 
       
(0.077) 
athrho 
       constant 
      
1.592*** 
       
(0.289) 
Number of Obs 2014 1757 2014 2014 1757 1757 2014 
Number of censored observations 
    
257 
rho 
      
0.920 
p-value for comparison test 
    
0.000 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
      
 
17. Occupations: INSEE PCS 2003 classification and age 
 
 
ordered 
logit pro contra pro contra Heckmann 
       
high skill priv. Sect. Over 55 
-0.624*** 0.795*** -0.747*** 0.946*** -0.946*** 0.897*** 
(0.155) (0.163) (0.172) (0.180) (0.180) (0.172) 
managers over 55 
-0.781*** 1.536*** -1.146*** 1.450*** -1.450*** 1.303*** 
(0.203) (0.341) (0.341) (0.341) (0.341) (0.321) 
farmers over 55 
-0.641*** 0.307** -0.607*** 0.620*** -0.620*** 0.512*** 
(0.169) (0.155) (0.168) (0.189) (0.189) (0.182) 
high skill public over 55 
-0.527*** 0.649*** -0.631*** 0.804*** -0.804*** 0.769*** 
(0.139) (0.160) (0.168) (0.178) (0.178) (0.171) 
personal services over 55 
-0.548*** 0.570*** -0.522** 0.693*** -0.693*** 0.573*** 
(0.163) (0.198) (0.204) (0.216) (0.216) (0.207) 
medium skill public under 55 
0.350*** 
 
0.355** 
   (0.128) 
 
(0.160) 
   
clerk priv. Sect. Over 55 
-0.331** 0.352*** -0.404*** 0.506*** -0.506*** 0.422*** 
(0.129) (0.135) (0.138) (0.149) (0.149) (0.141) 
technicians over 55 
-0.433** 0.587*** -0.419** 0.633*** -0.633*** 0.592*** 
(0.174) (0.186) (0.189) (0.196) (0.196) (0.183) 
personal services under 55 
-0.295* 0.381** 
 
0.432** -0.432** 0.405** 
(0.151) (0.163) 
 
(0.173) (0.173) (0.167) 
skilled workers under 55 0.225** 
 
0.410*** 
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(0.110) 
 
(0.131) 
   
unskilled workers under 55 
0.231* 
     (0.136) 
     
med. Skill private over 55  
0.506** 
 
0.532** -0.532** 0.488** 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.228) (0.228) (0.211) 
public clerk over 55  
0.251* -0.362*** 0.423*** -0.423*** 0.350** 
 
(0.135) (0.137) (0.150) (0.150) (0.146) 
med. Skill pulic over 55  
0.262* 
 
0.346** -0.346** 0.317** 
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.153) (0.153) (0.148) 
technicians under 55   
0.352** 
   
  
(0.167) 
   
skilled workers over 55    
0.231* -0.231* 
 
   
(0.135) (0.135) 
 constant 
 
-0.463*** 0.073* -0.376*** 0.376*** -0.486*** 
  
(0.039) (0.039) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) 
cut1 
      constant -1.432*** 
     
 
(0.053) 
     cut2 
      constant -0.242*** 
     
 
(0.039) 
     cut3 
      constant 0.664*** 
     
 
(0.041) 
     Selection equation 
      over 65 
      
       home duties 
    
-0.346* 
      
(0.183) 
primary education over 65      
-0.831*** 
     
(0.107) 
secundary education over 65      
-0.511*** 
     
(0.148) 
prime age first level prof. 
Educ.       
-0.372** 
     
(0.156) 
prime age prof. Educ.      
0.516** 
     
(0.212) 
prime age tertiary educ. L      
0.551** 
     
(0.217) 
prime age higher prof. Educ.      
0.397** 
     
(0.191) 
woman 
     
-0.166** 
      
(0.082) 
former unemployed      
0.163* 
     
(0.087) 
insider 
     
0.167* 
      
(0.086) 
constant 
     
1.226*** 
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(0.106) 
athrho 
      constant 
     
0.705*** 
      
(0.253) 
Number of Obs 1757 2014 2014 1757 1757 2014 
Number of censored observations 
   
257 
rho 
     
0.607 
p-value for comparison test 
   
0.005 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     
 
 
18. Easyness to find a new job in case of redundancy 
 
 
Heckman 
finding a new job: 
 somewhat easy -0.196** 
 
(0.095) 
somewhat difficult -0.269*** 
 
(0.088) 
very difficult -0.298*** 
 
(0.111) 
constant -0.192*** 
 
(0.050) 
selection equation 
 
primary education over 65 
-0.801*** 
(0.110) 
secundary education over 65 
-0.562*** 
(0.143) 
prime age first level prof. Educ.  
-0.392** 
(0.155) 
prime age prof. Educ. 
0.537** 
(0.211) 
prime age tertiary educ. L 
0.587*** 
(0.215) 
prime age higher prof. Educ. 
0.428** 
(0.189) 
woman -0.170** 
 
(0.081) 
former unemployed 
0.155* 
(0.086) 
insider 
0.147* 
(0.085) 
home duties 
-0.361** 
(0.173) 
constant 1.237*** 
 
(0.104) 
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athrho 
 constant 0.842*** 
 
(0.281) 
Number of Obs 2014 
Number of censored observations 257 
rho 0.687 
p-value for comparison test 0.003 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  
19. Opinions  
        
 
Heckman 
  Europe and social protection: afraid -0.290*** 
 
(0.064) 
unemployed could find a job: strongly disagree -0.414*** 
 
(0.084) 
unemployed could find a job:  disagree -0.217*** 
 
(0.068) 
Employment: important problem 0.280** 
 
(0.126) 
constant 0.022 
 
(0.064) 
selection equation 
 
primary education over 65 
-0.788*** 
(0.109) 
secundary education over 65 
-0.576*** 
(0.141) 
prime age first level prof. Educ.  
-0.406*** 
(0.152) 
prime age prof. Educ. 
0.557*** 
(0.209) 
prime age tertiary educ. L 
0.587*** 
(0.213) 
prime age higher prof. Educ. 
0.447** 
(0.187) 
woman -0.177** 
 
(0.080) 
former unemployed 
0.145* 
(0.086) 
insider 0.162* 
 
(0.084) 
home duties 
-0.392** 
(0.171) 
constant 1.231*** 
 
(0.103) 
athrho 
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constant 1.026*** 
 
(0.245) 
Number of Obs 2014 
Number of censored observations 257 
rho 0.772 
p-value for comparison test 0.000 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  
20. Vote at the first round of the 2012 presidential election 
 
 
Heckman 
Vote first round  
 Jean-Luc Mélenchon -0.419*** 
 
(0.098) 
François Hollande -0.236*** 
 
(0.067) 
constant -0.196*** 
 
(0.041) 
selection equation 
 
primary education over 65 
-0.792*** 
(0.107) 
secundary education over 65 
-0.618*** 
(0.142) 
prime age first level prof. Educ.  
-0.441*** 
(0.155) 
prime age prof. Educ. 
0.541*** 
(0.209) 
prime age tertiary educ. L 
0.580*** 
(0.213) 
prime age higher prof. Educ. 
0.441** 
(0.186) 
woman -0.157** 
 
(0.079) 
former unemployed 
0.148* 
(0.085) 
insider 0.154* 
 
(0.083) 
home duties 
-0.394** 
(0.166) 
constant 1.229*** 
 
(0.102) 
athrho 
 constant 1.318** 
 
(0.551) 
Number of Obs 2014 
Number of censored observations 257 
rho 0.866 
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p-value for comparison test 0.017 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
 
21. Left-Right differentiation 
 
 
Heckman Heckman 
   Far Left -0.299*** 
 
 
(0.079) 
 Left -0.206*** 
 
 
(0.072) 
 Left-Right scale 
 
0.055*** 
  
(0.012) 
constant -0.203*** -0.560*** 
 
(0.041) (0.065) 
selection equation 
  
primary education over 65 
-0.793*** -0.806*** 
(0.105) (0.109) 
secundary education over 65 
-0.613*** -0.653*** 
(0.141) (0.147) 
prime age first level prof. Educ.  
-0.425*** -0.434*** 
(0.154) (0.162) 
prime age prof. Educ. 
0.552*** 0.475** 
(0.209) (0.209) 
prime age tertiary educ. L 
0.594*** 0.519** 
(0.212) (0.214) 
prime age higher prof. Educ. 
0.446** 0.374** 
(0.186) (0.187) 
woman -0.164** -0.157* 
 
(0.079) (0.084) 
former unemployed 
0.150* 0.141 
(0.085) (0.090) 
insider 0.157* 0.113 
 
(0.083) (0.090) 
home duties 
-0.388** -0.396** 
(0.167) (0.179) 
constant 1.227*** 1.318*** 
 
(0.102) (0.111) 
athrho 
  constant 1.213*** 1.288*** 
 
(0.341) (0.420) 
Number of Obs 2014 1916 
Number of censored observations 257 223 
rho 0.837 0.859 
p-value for comparison test 0.000 0.002 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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